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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines the effect of minimum wage changes on employment, labour 
force participation and schooling using Canadian provincial data for the period 1981 to 
2000. This study uses two measures of schooling namely enrollment rates and 
continuation ratios. The analysis also includes the effect of the minimum wage on the 
employment and labour force participation of both teenage and adult age groups. The 
minimum wage variable in the regression analysis is the real adult minimum wage rate. 
Coverage of the minimum wage is not incorporated in the formula since minimum wage 
coverage is almost complete for the period being analyzed. Results show that the 
minimum wage has a significant negative effect on both employment and labour force 
participation rates for most age-sex groups studied. The effect of the minimum wage on 
enrollment rates and continuation ratios were insignificant for most grade and transition-
sex groups with positive results observed in most cases where significant results were 
obtained. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
So much debate exists in minimum wage literature on the effect of the minimum 
wage on important labor market variables such as employment, labor force participation 
and school enrollment of teenagers. Some of the existing empirical evidence contradicts 
the textbook prediction that a minimum wage increase has the effect of lowering general 
employment levels while others (in the majority) uphold that hypotheses. Evidence to 
support the effect of the minimum wage on participation rates and on school enrollment 
also is inconclusive as different authors obtain different results depending on the method 
of estimation used.  
These contradictory results have created a lot of confusion among all concerned, 
individuals and the society at large as to the actual effect of the minimum wage on the 
welfare of the lower income group, which it seeks to protect. This division continues to 
be manipulated by decision makers who continue to use the situation to support their 
policy intentions concerning the minimum wage. This creates a hole, which needs to be 
filled in the minds of citizens as to the actual intention of these decision makers. 
This trend of using the minimum wage as a pawn has gone on for so long in Canada, 
United States and worldwide. In Canada where the minimum wage is under provincial 
jurisdiction, fluctuations in the minimum wage have become the order of the day with 
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many of the provinces changing the value of the minimum wage more than once during 
the course of one calendar year.  
Expectations as to the effect of the minimum wage on employment do not exist on its 
own. There are spillover effects of the minimum wage effect on employment. Labor force 
participation rates and school enrollment of teenagers (who are usually in the lower 
income bracket due to their level of experience) are also affected by a minimum wage 
increase that affects employment rates. This raises the question of how long the Canadian 
public can withstand the continuous barrage by politicians on the economy with bogus 
claims of what the minimum wage can and cannot do.   
 
1.2 Some Important Facts and Definitions 
 Minimum wage legislation in Canada is under provincial jurisdiction and a federal 
minimum wage set equal to the provincial minimum wage exists in each province for 
federal workers residing in the respective jurisdictions. Data shows that enough variation 
exists in the minimum wage for each of the provinces to allow for a minimum wage study 
of the sort being carried out here. A minimum wage legislation sets a wage floor for 
employers to abide by and depending on whether coverage is complete or incomplete, 
this wage may either apply to all or specific persons and industries. In the respective 
jurisdictions in Canada, this coverage is found to be partially complete as the legal 
minimum is found to apply to all workers with the exception of certain industries and 
occupations in some provinces. 
 Educational attainment in Canada is under provincial jurisdiction and is free in the 
public school category. Four types of schools exist in Canada in the elementary-
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secondary category, namely public schools, private schools, federal schools and schools 
for the disabled (Statistics Canada, 2000).  According to the Webster’s English 
Dictionary (concise edition, 1997), education is defined as the process of learning as well 
as the training that accompanies the learning. Enrollment rates can be defined as the 
number of enrolled persons expressed as a percentage of the population of high school 
students in each jurisdiction. High school enrollment rates in Canada vary by province. 
 The labour force variables of employment and participation rates in the different 
provinces are reported by age and gender groups. Employment rates are defined by 
Statistics Canada as the number of people employed expressed as a percentage of the 
population in that group. Employed persons are defined by labour force Canada as any 
person who did any work at all or had a job but was absent from work. 
 Participation rates are defined by Statistics Canada as the number of employed and 
unemployed in each demographic group expressed as a percentage of the population in 
that group. Employed plus unemployed persons make up the labour force or participant 
population. 
 
 1.3 The Objectives of the Study 
Contradictory evidence on the effect of the minimum wage exists in the United 
States, Canada and in the rest of the world. This leaves individuals and the society as a 
whole at a loss as to the actual effect of the minimum wage on important labor market 
variables such as employment, participation and enrollment rates.  
In effect, the objectives of this study are as follows: 
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 to examine the economic relationship between minimum wage changes and 
employment rates 
 to examine the economic relationship between minimum wage changes and 
participation rates using empirical evidence for various demographic groups 
in ten Canadian provinces. 
 to examine the effect of the minimum wage on high school enrollment rates 
and continuation ratios 
 to reconcile the different kinds of evidence obtained in early and recent 
minimum wage literature 
 
The new evidence will be aimed at helping policy makers make rational decisions 
with legislations involving the minimum wage. Also as the popular saying goes, 
‘information is power’ and with this new evidence, individuals may now be able to 
access their leaders based on their stand on the minimum wage amongst other things and 
not rely on bogus claims to make voting decisions. 
 
 1.4 The Importance of the Study 
The welfare of the individual and the society relies heavily on such labor market 
variables such as employment, labor force participation and educational attainment. A lot 
is at stake with a policy that may alter the levels of these important variables.  
Canada is a country with enough variation in its minimum wage to allow for this kind 
of study as minimum wage in Canada is under provincial jurisdiction and allows enough 
variation for a minimum wage study with enough regression power to draw a decisive 
conclusion on the effects of the minimum wage. 
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Despite the attractive nature of the Canadian minimum wage data, a review of the 
existing empirical work in Canada shows that a lot is lacking. Firstly, no available work 
studies the impact of the minimum wage on the three economic variables that remain the 
focus of this study. Several studies in Canada by Swidinsky (1980) and Schassfma and 
Walsh (1983) study the effect of the minimum wage on employment and participation 
rates using the same data set while others by Baker and Stanger (1999) have studied the 
effect of the minimum wage on employment and yet others like Landon (1997) have tried 
to estimate the effect on high school enrollment. This study will attempt to estimate the 
impact of the minimum wage on employment, participation and enrollment rates using 
the same data set. Since there may be spillover effects from one variable to the other this 
study will also attempt to capture the quantity of that effect. 
This study will attempt to use two panel data methods (pooling and differencing) in 
order to determine the validity of claims made in past studies reviewed in chapter two 
and to see to what extent this might change the results. These previous studies have 
derived varying results depending on the estimation method used. 
In addition to the above, this study will attempt to use the most recent available data 
spanning through the 1980’s to the year 2000 in order to reveal the most recent evidence 
on the effect of the minimum wage on our variables of interest. 
When this work is completed, decision makers will effectively use their rights to 
decide whom to put into office based on their minimum wage policy. In addition, this 
will provide a tool based on a recent and reliable study for policy makers in the Canadian 
environment to utilize for formulating policies regarding the minimum wage. Most 
importantly, individuals faced with a decision to employ, participate in the labor force or 
  
 
6
attain education will be effectively armed to make their decisions based on the results 
obtained in this study. 
 
1.5 Thesis Organization 
This thesis is organized into six chapters. The first chapter is an introduction, while 
chapter two is a review of existing literature. Chapter three covers the theoretical 
concepts surrounding the minimum wage, employment, participation, education and 
human capital attainment. Chapter four deals with econometric specifications, data and 
descriptive statistics. Chapter 5 presents the estimated results and chapter 6 is a 
conclusion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
7
 
Chapter 2 
Facts and Literature 
This chapter first discusses the minimum wage levels in the different Canadian 
provinces. It also goes further to provide a description of the minimum wage labour 
market and schooling enrollment patterns in Canada. Finally, the chapter provides a 
thorough literature review of past minimum wage literature covering the United States, 
Canada and the international scene. 
 
2.1 Minimum Wage in Canada 
Minimum wage legislation in Canada is under provincial jurisdiction although a 
Federal minimum wage set equal to the provincial minimum wage existing in each 
province for federal workers residing in the respective jurisdictions has existed since July 
17, 1996. The coverage of the adult minimum wage is extensive as it applies to the 
majority of the Canadian workforce although on rare occasions, coverage is incomplete. 
Also in rare instances, small differentials ranging from 25 to 45 cents an hour exist in the 
minimum wage in some jurisdictions. For instance there is incomplete coverage for farm 
workers in Saskatchewan, Manitoba and Alberta while youth differentials exist in Ontario 
and British Columbia (Battle, 2003).  
 Minimum wage rates across the provinces and territories as of the year 2000 vary 
from $5.5 per hour in Newfoundland to $7.15 per hour in British Columbia. Figure 2.1 
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below shows the hourly minimum wage in September 2000 for each province under 
study (Human Resources Canada, 2003). 
Figure 2.1: Minimum Wage Rate by Province (2000) 
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Source: Author’s configuration using data from Human Resources Canada, 2003 
 
Figure 2.1 shows the variation in the hourly minimum wage rate that existed 
between the provinces. The minimum wage rate varied from $5.50 in Newfoundland, 
$5.60 in Prince Edward Island and Nova Scotia, $5.90 in Alberta, $6.00 in Manitoba and 
Saskatchewan, $6.85 in Ontario, $6.90 in Quebec, and $7.15 in British Columbia. 
The minimum wage rate is set in nominal dollars and adjusted upward from time 
to time. For example, Alberta increased its minimum wage from $5.65 an hour in April, 
1999 to $5.90 an hour in October 1999; British Columbia from $6.50 in March 1995 to 
$7.00 in October 1995; Manitoba from $3.35 in March 1981 to $3.55 in September 1981 
and from $4.50 in April 1987 to $4.70 in September 1987 just to mention a few. 
Figure 2.2 shows the percentage change in the real minimum wage rate deflated 
by the consumer price index in constant 1992 prices from the period 1981 to 2000 for 
each province under study.  
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Figure 2.2: Percentage Change in the Real Minimum Wage Rate (1992 Prices) by 
Province (1981-2000) 
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Source: Author’s configuration using data from Human Resources Canada, 2003 
 
The figure above shows that the percentage change from 1981 to 2000 in the 
indexed hourly minimum wage rate varied from a –7.5% in British Columbia, -6.8% in 
Ontario, -0.8%in Nova Scotia, 4.4% in Prince Edward Island, Quebec and New 
Brunswick, 10.5% in Newfoundland, 12.1% in Manitoba, 17.6% in Alberta and 20.1% in 
Saskatchewan. Both 2.1 and 2.2 show that enough variation exists in the minimum wage 
among provinces and over time to allow for a minimum wage study of the sort being 
conducted here. 
 
 2.2 Minimum Wage Labour Market in Canada 
A Statistics Canada survey estimates that minimum wage workers in Canada 
made up about 4.6% of the 12.5 million employees in the Canadian workforce in the year 
2000. Of the total 580,000 minimum wage workers, 62.1% were women while 37.9% 
were men. The same survey also showed that the probability of working for the minimum 
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wage was higher for younger persons. The 15 -19 age group for instance made up 6.6% 
of all employees but 47.1% of all minimum wage workers while the 20-24 age group 
made up 10.8% of all workers but 16.4 percent of all minimum wage workers. Going up 
the age ladder, the 25-44 age group made up about 52.7% of all workers and 23.2% of all 
minimum wage workers while the 45 and above age group made up 29.9% of all workers 
but only 13.4 percent of all minimum wage workers in the year 2000 (Battle, 2003).  
The level of education one has also plays a very important role in the incidence of 
working for the minimum wage. Statistical evidence shows that postsecondary and 
university graduates are less likely to work for the minimum wage than high school 
graduates are. Evidence also shows that part-time work increases the likelihood of 
working for the minimum wage as 26.3% of part-time workers earn minimum wage when 
compared to 5.7% of full-time workers. It is very common for young people to combine 
school and part time work (Battle, 2003). 
The same study by Ken Battle shows that the incidence of working for the 
minimum wage also varies by family status. In 2000, 60.2% of minimum wage workers 
of which more than half were part-time workers were older children living with parents. 
Members of couples (married or co-habitants) made up 25% of minimum wage workers, 
unattached individuals made up 10.7% of minimum wage workers while family heads 
without a spouse made up 4.1% of minimum wage workers. 
Differences also exist by industry in the percentage of their workforce that are 
paid the minimum wage and can be ranked as follows for some of the affected industries: 
Accommodation and food services (19.4%), agriculture (15.4%), trade (8.8%), other 
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services (7.7%), information, culture and recreation (6.2%), management, administrative 
and other support (5.1%) (Battle, 2003). 
 
2.3 Education in Canada 
The importance of education cannot be overestimated as it encompasses all areas of 
life. It has been defined in so many different ways but according to the Cambridge 
advanced learners dictionary (2003), education is the knowledge acquired from teaching 
and learning or the process of teaching and learning in a formal setting. This definition 
although appropriate for the kind of education referred to in this study makes light of the 
actual meaning of this concept as education in its entirety involves teaching and learning 
in both formal and informal settings. 
Educational attainment plays a vital role in the development of any society and for 
this reason should never be taken for granted. High school (elementary-secondary level) 
education is of particular importance for its preparatory value to future education. Early 
school leaving is a detriment to the society as it is usually associated with higher criminal 
offences, lower paying jobs and an increased dependence on welfare. Several studies 
have been conducted to calculate the private and social returns to education. Vallaincourt  
(1995) conducted one of those studies in Canada. He found that the private and social 
returns of completing high school rather than dropping out were 33.4 and 11.9 percent for 
men and 38.5 and 9.1 percent for women.  
 In Canada, high-school education is under provincial jurisdiction and is free in the 
public school category. Four types of schools exist in Canada in the elementary-
secondary category, namely public, private, federal schools and schools for the disabled 
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(Statistics Canada, 2000).  The same report shows that by the 1998-99 school year, 
15,911 elementary-secondary schools existed in Canada, a slight decline from 16,000 in 
the 1996-97 school year. The structure of education in Canada is such that the elementary 
school comprises the first six to eight years of compulsory schooling in most jurisdictions 
after which comes secondary schooling, which offers a choice of academic and 
vocational programs.  
The point at which an individual makes the transition from elementary to secondary 
varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Figure 2.3 shows the levels within elementary-
secondary schools in the different provinces. High school education in Quebec ends with 
grade eleven and the structure of education in New Brunswick is dependent on the 
language of dominance (Statistics Canada, 1999).  
 
Figure 2.3: Levels Within Elementary-Secondary Schools by Province 
Newfoundland 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Prince Edward Island 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Nova Scotia 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
New Brunswick1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
New Brunswick2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Quebec 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11  
Ontario 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 123 
Manitoba 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Saskatchewan 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Alberta 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
British Columbia 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
 
 
 Elementary/Primary  1 English speaking sector 
 Junior High/Middle  2 French speaking sector 
 Senior High  3 Includes O. A. C. = Ontario Academic course 
 Secondary    
Source: Statistics Canada (2000) 
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The Statistics Canada report for the Pan Canadian Education Indicators Program 
(1999) reveals that in 1995 (most current year of study by the Organization for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD)), Canada had the highest investment in 
education and the second highest per student expenditure as a proportion of GDP when 
compared to the other G-7 nations.   
In Canada, the legal school dropout age was 16 years of age for all provinces in the 
period 1981 to 1990 with the exception of Newfoundland, Quebec and British Columbia 
where the legal dropout age was 15 years of age. By the 1991-92 school years, the legal 
dropout age in all the provinces became 16 years of age. Compulsory schooling is 
required for 6 to 7 year olds depending on the jurisdiction (Elementary – secondary 
enrollment 1991 - 92). The outcome of educational attendance although mostly affected 
by population is also expected to be greatly influenced by the legal dropout age.  
High-school graduation requirements are same for all jurisdictions with high-school 
diplomas granted to students who pass all compulsory and optional courses required for 
the completion of their study. At the completion of high school education, students may 
apply to universities to further their education. An exception exists for Quebec students 
who must earn a CEGEP diploma before they can proceed to the university (Statistics 
Canada, 1999). 
The Statistics Canada report for the Pan Canadian Education Indicators Program 
(1999) shows that there has been an increase in the number of Canadians graduating from 
high school. There has been a decline in the proportion of 25-29 year olds with less than 
high school education from 20 to 13 percent between 1990 and 1998. In addition, the 
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percentage of university graduates increased from 17 to 26 percent between 1990 and 
1998. The same study concluded that individuals with less than a high school education 
have a much higher incidence of being employed for part time work (even though full-
time is preferred) than those with a high school. 
The elementary-secondary schools are all under the jurisdiction of the provincial 
government in which they exist even though the federal government plays an important 
role in line with its goal of supporting human resource development. School boards exist 
in all jurisdictions to manage these schools. A lot of cooperation exists among these 
school boards especially for planning, purchasing, and curriculums development (The 
Council of Ministers of Education Canada (CMEC), 1996). 
 
2.4 Past Studies on the Labour Market Impact of Minimum Wage  
2.4.1 United States Empirical Evidence 
The first state minimum wage law in the United States was passed in the state of 
Massachusetts in 1912. Even though this law was successfully challenged by the courts 
and eliminated as soon as it came into place, it was reinstated in 1937 with the 
establishment of a national minimum wage legislation. This legislation formed the basis 
for the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (Card and Krueger, 1995). 
 Minimum wage issues have fascinated economists in the United States since the 
early nineteen hundreds. Most of the earliest studies were carried out with time series 
data and found a negative employment effect of the minimum wage. The estimating 
equation used by these early studies is of the following form:  
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Yt = f(MWt, Xt1……..Xtk) + et                                      (2.1) 
 
Where Yt represents some measure of employment, unemployment, participation 
or enrolment in time t, MWt is the minimum wage variable, f (.) is a function of a set of 
independent variables including the minimum wage in time t, the adult male 
unemployment rate (used as a cyclical variable) and the fraction of students enrolled in 
school and in manpower training programs just to mention a few and et is the stochastic 
error term. More generally, trend terms, interactions, and seasonal dummies have been 
included as some of the explanatory variables. The Kaitz index, originated by Kaitz 
(1970) has been a variable of interest in most of the early studies. This variable is 
basically the minimum wage deflated by some average wage variable and multiplied by 
the coverage rate of the minimum wage. Card and Krueger (1995) take an exception to 
the preference exhibited over the years for the Kaitz index. They claim that this index 
was developed because of the unavailability of wage data in the 70’s for teenagers and 
low-wage earners who the minimum wage seemed to affect most. They criticized the use 
of the Kaitz index in recent times and noted that the logarithm of the actual minimum 
wage was more highly correlated with teenage wages than was the Kaitz index.  
Mincer (1976) estimated the impact of minimum wage legislation on employment 
and labor force participation for 10 age-sex-colour demographic groups using quarterly 
data from 1954 to 1969. He found the net employment effect to be negative for all the 
groups studied except for non-white males. The net participation effect was also negative 
for all groups with the largest negative effects available for non-white teenagers and non-
white adult males.  
  
 
16
Gramlich, et al, (1976) used time series data from 1948 to 1975 to estimate the 
impact of minimum wage legislation on employment outcomes of both teenagers and 
adults working part-time and full-time. They found that the employment of teenagers was 
reduced by an increase in minimum wage while employment of adult males was 
increased. In addition, the proportion of adult males working part time increased with an 
increase in the minimum wage. From their study, they concluded that an increase in the 
minimum wage causes employers to substitute less experienced teenagers with adults and 
vice versa for a reduction in the minimum wage. 
Using time-series data from 1963 to 1972, Ragan (1977) studied the effect of the 
minimum wage on employment, unemployment and labour force participation of youths. 
He used 16 youth sub-groups and sought to test the well-known hypotheses that an 
increase in minimum wage reduces youth employment while increasing youth 
unemployment. His dependent variables were the ratio of employed, unemployed and 
labour force to population. His independent variables include the minimum wage 
variable, the unemployment rate of prime aged males, a manpower variable, population 
and a set of seasonal dummy variables. His results were not novel as he found that a 
negative correlation exists between minimum wage and youth employment. This 
correlation was higher for non-white males than for any other group studied. He also 
found the relationship between participation of youths in the labour force and the 
minimum wage to vary depending on the youth sub-group in question. A more positive 
correlation was found to exist between minimum wage and participation rates for 
students than for non-students. 
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Brown, Gilroy and Kohen conducted a thorough literature review of some of the 
earlier US time-series studies in their paper titled ‘The effect of the minimum wage on 
employment and unemployment’. Brown, et al, (1982) summarized the results of these 
studies. Table 2.1 presents an excerpt from one of their summaries of the effect of 
minimum wage changes on the employment rate of different age-sex groups using time-
series data.  
Table 2.1: Effect of Minimum Wage on Employment  
Estimated effect of a 10 percent change in the minimum wage of teenagers (16-19), Elasticity (*10) 
Author White males White 
females 
Nonwhite 
males 
Nonwhite 
females 
All workers 
Kaitz (1970) -1.210 -7.46 1.165 .438 -0.98 
Kosters and Welch (1972) -3.31 -2.41 -3.56 -3.01 -2.96 
Kelly (1975) -1.620 -0.700 -1.775 -0.80 -1.204 
Kelly (1976) -0.35 -0.96 _ _ -0.66 
Mincer (1976) -0.205 _ -4.65 _ -2.31 
Welch (1976) _ _ _ _ -1.78 
Ragan (1977) -0.81 -0.09 -0.35 -0.10 -0.65 
Mattila (1978) -0.72 -0.1.00 _ _ -0.84 
Freeman (1979) _ _ _ _ -2.46 
Wachter and Kim (1979) -1.883 -2.722 -3.290 -7.710 -2.519 
Iden (1980) -2.31 _ -3.81 _ 2.26 
Abowd, et al, (1981) _ _ _ _ -2.13 
Betsey and Dunson (1981) -1.50 _ -0.33 _ -1.39 
Boschen, et al, (1981) _ _ _ _ -1.50 
Brown, et al, (1981) -1.08 _ 0.16 _ -0.96 
Hammermesh (1981) _ _ _ _ -1.21 
Ragan (1981) -0.41 -0.35 -3.51 0.51 -0.52 
Source: Brown, et al,(1982) 
 
Overall, we see that these authors mostly observed that the impact of the 
minimum wage on employment is a negative one. The magnitude of this impact depends 
on the method of estimation and also on the group being studied. 
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Solon (1985) and Wellington (1991) have been some of the more recent 
economists to study the impact of the minimum wage using time –series data. They found 
a smaller negative relationship (-0.99 and -0.60) to exist between the minimum wage and 
the employment rates of teenagers when compared to the studies done by most of their 
contemporaries. The time-series elasticity estimates of the impact of the minimum wage 
have been the most supportive of the traditional minimum wage theory in early and 
recent times. 
The problem with these times-series studies is that the series are really short and 
measure the effect of the minimum wage across a broad band when cyclical factors in the 
economy may actually be affecting the level of employment and participation rates. 
Using quarterly data to increase the number of observations for these regressions 
introduces some forms of seasonality thereby rendering the results unreliable for 
inference. 
More recent studies of the minimum wage in the United States have been 
conducted with cross-sectional and panel data. Since this study makes use of panel data, I 
will review the panel data evidence in detail for readers to compare with the current work 
at hand. These studies are presented in the next section as most of the studies reported 
using this technique also included an estimation of the enrollment impact of the minimum 
wage. Equation 2.2 shows the general format for the estimating equation used by authors 
such as Baker and Stanger (1999) and Swidinsky (1980) who conducted minimum wage 
studies using panel data with only a few modifications existing from study to study.  
 
Yit = Bo + f(MWit + Xit + t + ai ) + eit                (2.2) 
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Where Yit represents some measure of employment, unemployment, participation 
or enrolment in time t. MWit is a minimum wage variable, which is usually a variant of 
the Kaitz index in state form. Xit is a set of independent variables including the prime 
aged male unemployment rate, gross domestic product, and possibly school enrollment 
rate just to mention a few. The acronyms ai and t represent state fixed and time varying 
effects and eit represents the stochastic error term. 
The impact of the minimum wage has also been estimated by a series of natural 
experiments by a number of economists in the United States (Lester; 1946, Card and 
Krueger; 1994 and 1995, Deere et al; 1995 etc). This group of economists argues that 
using natural experiments are the way to go in estimating the impact of the minimum 
wage because when compared to other methods used for this study, a cause-effect 
relationship could be very easily determined with the use of natural experiments.  
In a series of articles which were eventually culminated in their book ‘Myth and 
Measurement: The New Economics of the Minimum Wage’, Card and Krueger (1995) 
conducted a number of natural experiments which involved a control group and a 
treatment group to determine the impact of minimum wages on pay rates and 
employment. In one of these studies, they used a sample of over 400 restaurants in New 
Jersey where the minimum wage was increased and Eastern Pennsylvania, where the 
minimum wage was unchanged from its previous value. They found that employment 
increased in New Jersey where the minimum wage was increased. Similar experiments 
with similar results were conducted by the same authors in Texas, 1991 and in California, 
1988 using a sample of fast-food restaurants in those areas. 
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These experiments mark a major turning point in minimum wage literature where 
the expected outcome of minimum wage hikes is to reduce employment as predicted by 
economists hundreds of years ago.  Card and Krueger (1995) doubt the validity of these 
earlier studies and criticize them on a number of grounds for possible bias influenced by 
the conventional view on the minimum wage. Among their concerns is the problem of 
publication bias, which they claimed existed with the earlier published articles. They 
argue that authors tend to publish only those articles that support the conventional view 
of the minimum wage. They also claimed that the authors were induced to choose the 
specifications for their estimating equations, functional forms and age group studied in 
order to arrive at results that support the conventional view. They claimed that these 
earlier studies preferred the use of teenagers as their study group as this leads them to 
arrive at expected results. With the help of meta-analysis statistical method, (a test that 
tries to determine the relationship between the t-statistic and the sample size) they tried to 
determine if the t-statistics from these studies rise with the sample size. If it does not, 
then two possibilities exist; publication bias and inconsistencies due to structural changes 
in the economy. Their assessment of the possibility that those studies contained 
publication bias revealed that publication bias was at the root of the statistically 
significant results. They also expected that the short time-series that existed in those 
times gave a low power to the regression results thereby rendering the results unreliable. 
To verify this, they replicated some of those earlier studies with longer time series to find 
that the negative relationship earlier obtained between the minimum wage variable and 
employment rates got weaker as the length of the time series increased. 
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The natural experiment method used by Card and Krueger as well as some of their 
colleagues certainly have some advantages. The fact that no model is required to conduct 
these experiments eliminates the problem of the choice of an adequate model to use 
thereby eliminating bias in estimates. As long as the control group is properly selected, 
results from these experiments have a good chance of being influenced solely by the 
minimum wage change and not by any structural changes in the economy. This method 
may not be foolproof since the proper selection of a control group requires some 
preliminary steps to ensure that it is identical to the treatment group. 
The contradictory results experienced in the United States literature show that the 
minimum wage still presents a puzzle. Different results were derived based on 
differences in estimation methods, model specification and in data selection. In the next 
section, we will examine Canadian minimum wage literature and see how it compares 
with that in the United States. 
2.4.2 Canadian Empirical Evidence  
The earliest minimum wage studies in Canada were conducted on specific low 
wage industries in specific provinces. To carry out these studies, the authors made use of 
questionnaire surveys to ascertain the impact of a minimum wage change. Swidinsky 
(1980) cited (Zaidi, 1970; Fantl and Wittingham, 1970; Rhodes, 1973; Dhruvaragan, 
1974 and Maphangoh, 1976) in his work ‘Minimum wages and teenage unemployment’. 
He points out that the researchers all found statistically insignificant unemployment 
effects of the minimum wage.  
 Using the Labour Market Activity Survey of longitudinal data from 1988 - 1999, 
Yuen (1998) conducted the first micro data panel study in Canada on a sample of 9,379 
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individuals to investigate the impact of the minimum wage on the employment of 
teenagers and young adults. He worked with quarterly data and modeled the probability 
that an individual would be employed in the period following a minimum wage hike 
conditional on a set of control variables including the unemployment rate and Gross 
Domestic Product in province i in and in time t. He included four dummy variables in his 
regression as controls for the minimum wage, demography, province and time or season. 
The regression results indicate that teenagers and young adults in the minimum wage 
bracket were 6% to 10% less likely to be employed after an 8.4% minimum wage hike. 
His result confirmed findings in the United States by Currie and Fallick (1996) who used 
the same methodology as Yuen to carry out their study. Since this study and similar ones 
in the United States were criticized for making comparisons between high and low wage 
workers, Yuen (1998) reestimated his equation with only a sample of low-wage workers 
and found that there existed no statistically significant minimum wage effect on youth 
employment.   
 Swidinsky (1980) notes that the usefulness of Micro data for analyzing specific 
changes in minimum wage legislation by firms is diminished when the need for analyzing 
aggregate employment and labour force participation for successive changes in the 
minimum wage arises as is the case in Canada where minimum wage legislation is under 
provincial jurisdiction. He adopted the models operated by Mincer (1976) to examine the 
impact of the minimum wage on the unemployment of teens (14 – 19 years) with a 
pooled – cross-section of five Canadian regions from 1956 – 1975. He modeled the 
teenage employment rate, labour force participation and unemployment rate conditional 
on a set of explanatory variables that included a coverage-weighted minimum wage index 
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by gender, the prime aged male unemployment rate, a quadratic time trend, and regional 
dummy variables to capture region fixed effects. Swidinsky (1980) used region level 
panel data and found a statistically significant negative relationship between the 
minimum wage and employment/ labour force participation among males and females. 
This effect was stronger for males than for females contradictory to research results in the 
United States where similar specifications and methodology were used. 
 Schaafsma and Walsh (1983) conducted their study on the effect of the minimum 
wage on employment and labour supply for six age-sex groups using Canadian provincial 
data from 1975 - 1979. They modeled employment rate and labour force participation 
against a set of control variables which include the real minimum wage rate (as opposed 
to a coverage-weighted minimum wage variable used in most studies), the gross domestic 
product and provincial dummy variables. The results showed a negative correlation 
between the minimum wage and employment for five out of the six age-sex groups 
studied. The participation regression results showed that a negative relationship existed 
between minimum wage and labour force participation for all male groups and the female 
teenage group. The results also show that teenagers are less likely than other groups to 
withdraw from the labor force in the event of a minimum wage hike. Overall, these 
results showed that the minimum wage has a positive impact on the unemployment rate 
of the six age-sex groups. 
 Baker and Stanger (1999) studied the effect of minimum wage hikes on 
employment of teenagers in Canada over the period 1975 – 1993 using provincial level 
data. The dependent variable used for the model specification was the employment 
population ratio in the ith province in year t. The explanatory variables are the minimum 
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wage variable (ratio of the adult minimum wage to the average manufacturing wage), real 
gross domestic product, unemployment rate of prime-aged males, the ratio of teens to the 
working age population, province fixed effects, year effects and a quadratic trend. The 
models were estimated by ordinary least squares and weighted least squares in both linear 
and log forms. Table 2.2 below is a summary of their results in both the linear and log 
specifications used. 
 Column one results were controlled for a quadratic trend, while column two was 
estimated by weighted least squares. Column three is a weighted least square estimate 
corrected for heteroskedasticity and serial correlation, column four is estimated by 
weighted least squares without province effects while column 5 was estimated by 
weighted least squares without trend terms. 
Table 2.2: Effect of the Minimum Wage on Employment 
Linear 1 2 3 4 5 
Minimum wage elasticity -0.284 -0.305 -0.305 -0.502 -0.322 
Logarithmic 1 2 3 4 5 
Log minimum wage elast. 0.103 0.041 0.041 -0.390 -0.233 
Source: Baker and Stanger  (1999) 
 
The results in the table above show the extent to which different results are 
obtained when different functional forms and estimation methods are used. The minimum 
wage elasticities were calculated at the sample mean and show that a one percent increase 
in the minimum wage would result in a .23 to a .50 percent reduction in the employment 
population ratio of teenagers. The authors also carried out a number of tests one of which 
is the Box-Cox test to ascertain the best specification. The linear specification was 
selected to be the more appropriate. A sensitivity analysis of the minimum wage variable 
deflated by the average manufacturing wage (with and without overtime), the average 
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industrial wage, the average wage in retail and the consumer price index (provincial and 
national) was also conducted. The result of this analysis showed that the elasticities fall 
within the same range in the linear specification. 
Consequently, they took differenced the data in order to get reconciliation with 
previous studies where most zero or positive minimum wage effects were obtained as in 
the case of Card and Krueger (1995). The first differenced results showed insignificant 
and positive elasticities. Negative and more statistically significant elasticities were 
obtained by the time fourth differences were taken. 
Shuk-Lin Kan and Sharir (1996) used pooled cross-sections to study the effect of 
the minimum wage on employment and participation rates for six age-sex groups in nine 
Canadian provinces. They found that the minimum wage had no effect on the 
employment rate of the teenage group while a negative effect was found to exist between 
the minimum wage and the employment rate of the older groups. The effect of the 
minimum wage on participation rates was negative for all groups studied leaving the 
authors to assume that the discouraged worker effect was dominant. 
Using pooled data for four provinces, Goldberg and Green (1999) also found 
small disemployment effects of an increase in the minimum wage for all age-sex groups 
studied. They found no immediate disemployment effects to exist. Long run effects in the 
range of 0 to 2 percent decrease in employment due to a 1 percent increase in the 
minimum wage was obtained. 
Results from this study agree mostly with the time-series and panel data evidence 
as opposed to the natural experiment used by Card and Krueger (1994). Card and 
Krueger’s conclusions were obtained from their study of the effect of the minimum wage 
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in the fast food industry. These conclusions are consistent with the results obtained by the 
earliest minimum wage authors in Canada who studied the effect of the minimum wage 
on specific low wage industries. A panel study is more likely to capture the effect of the 
minimum wage on an aggregate basis. Other advantages associated with panel data are 
that they increase the power of a regression and function very well when there exists 
some heterogeneity between the cross-sectional units as is the case with Canada. 
2.4.3 International Evidence 
Minimum wage studies have been conducted in a number of industrialized 
countries that have minimum wage legislation. In many of these countries, a large 
number of differentials exist in their minimum wage structure and this makes it 
impossible for comparisons to be made between the countries where the effect of the 
minimum wage on labour market variables is concerned. A few of these studies will be 
discussed in this section just to get a clue on what goes on in other continents.  
 Starting with the United Kingdom, Stewart (2003) made use of individual level 
panel data to investigate effect of the introduction of the United Kingdoms minimum in 
April, 1999, on employment of workers currently earning the minimum in four selected 
demographic groups. He found neither a significant nor adverse employment effect to 
exist in his study. Machin, et al, (2002), using a different methodology conducted a study 
of the 1999 minimum wage introduction in care homes in the United Kingdom and found 
negative employment effects. Even though these results form evidence from the same 
country, they show the difference that the methodology used and the demographic group 
studied can create in the results obtained in minimum wage studies. In contrast, minimum 
wage studies in Portugal by Pereira (2000) to investigate the impact of the 1987 upgrade 
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of teenage minimum wage in Portugal to the existing adult rate resulted in a significant 
negative effect on the general employment rate in Portugal. 
 Conflicting results of this nature continually dominate the international minimum 
wage literature. Eriksson and Pytlikova (2002) sought empirical evidence on the impact 
of the minimum wage in the Czech and Slovak Republics and found no clear evidence of 
a negative employment effect as predicted by theory. Dolado, et al, (1996) in a study of 
the European experience found no significant minimum wage effect except for a selection 
of young workers. In Ireland, Nolan, et al, (2001) found that most industries in which 
labour constituted a major part of the wage bill suffered adverse employment effects with 
an increase in the minimum wage. In addition, O’Neill, et al, (2002) found a negative 
employment effect from a survey of firms in Ireland on the introduction of a national 
minimum wage for a group of firms mostly affected by the minimum wage change.  Keil, 
et al, (2001) in a case for the German unification concluded that the adoption of 
minimum wage schedules in East Germany created adverse employment effects.  
 Evidence from Puerto-Rico is unique in the sense that Puerto- Rico adopts the US 
minimum wage. Reynolds and Gregory (1965) and Castillo-Freeman and Freeman (1992) 
studied the impact of a US minimum wage in a less boisterous economic environment, as 
is the case in Puerto-rico. One could hardly rely on their conclusions even though they 
seemed to support the textbook evidence.  Therefore, the criticisms laboured on these 
studies over the years have been well founded as a US minimum when applied to Puerto-
rico could hardly be relied on for a conclusive minimum wage study. 
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 2.5 Past Studies on the Enrollment Impact of the Minimum Wage 
In the United States Neumark and Wascher (1995b) used individual level panel 
data for all the states from the period 1979 – 1992 to estimate the impact of the minimum 
wage on the employment and school enrollment of teenagers. They categorized these 
teenagers into various school/ work activities (in school not employed, not in school not 
employed, not in school employed and in school employed) and estimated the impact of 
the minimum wage on the probability of each school-work activity. Their results indicate 
that the minimum wage reduces the probability of being enrolled in school whether 
employed or unemployed. The results also showed that the minimum wage is also 
significantly positively related to not being enrolled and employed. These results imply 
that the probability of participation in the labour force increases with hikes in the 
minimum wage even though the probability of employment does not increase. The 
elasticity of being employed with an increase in the minimum wage was less negative 
than that of being enrolled. 
Evans and Turner (1995) criticized the enrollment measure used by Neumark and 
Wascher but continued to use the minimum wage variable supplied by them to reestimate 
their study. What Evans and Turner (1995) left out according to Neumark and Wascher 
(2003) is the use of an appropriate minimum wage variable for their estimates. Neumark 
and Wascher (2003) went ahead to re-estimate their regressions with a broader 
enrollment variable and the appropriate minimum wage variable. Their updated results 
show that minimum wage was significantly positively related to the probability of being 
employed but not enrolled and also to being unemployed and not enrolled. 
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Chaplin, et al, (2003) sought evidence to determine the impact of the minimum 
wage on teenage enrollment with state level panel data from the 1989-90 to 1996-97 
school year. This study is of primary interest because they used a unique measure of 
school enrollment called grade continuation ratios. These grade continuation ratios were 
regressed over a set of explanatory variables that include the unemployment rate, 
manufacturing wage, dummies for legal dropout age and dummies for high school credit/ 
exit exams. The results of the regressions indicate that a negative correlation exists 
between higher minimum wages and the continuation ratio for grade 9-10’s in states with 
legal dropout age below 18. The authors therefore concluded that older teenagers do not 
leave school as easily as the younger ones who have not accumulated enough human 
capital investment to realize the need for an education. This was also justified by the fact 
that states with legal dropout age over 18 experienced a lower negative correlation in 
comparison to others with lower legal dropout age.  
A number of other economists in the United States estimated the impact of the 
minimum wage on school enrollment. Some of these authors (Neumark and Wascher, 
1995b; Turner and Demiralp, 2001) find that higher minimum wages reduce school 
enrollment while others (Card, 1992 and Mattila, 1978) find a zero or positive correlation 
between minimum wage and school enrollment. Overall, the effect of the minimum wage 
on school enrollment is inconclusive as varying results were obtained. The differences in 
the elasticity outcomes can be explained by the fact that the various researchers used 
different methodologies and data sets. 
Employment effects of the minimum wage have dominated minimum wage 
literature in Canada but few studies have been conducted to determine the impact of the 
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minimum wage on school enrollment. One of those studies was by Landon (1997) who 
investigated the impact of the minimum wage on school enrollment with pooled time – 
series data from 1975 – 1989 for six of the ten provinces in Canada. He modeled the 
enrollment rates of 16 and 17 year old males and females conditional on a set of 
explanatory variables, which he organized into four categories: the minimum wage 
variable, education spending and education structure variables, other economic variables 
and social structure variables.  
The minimum wage variable was deflated by the average hourly wage. The 
education spending variables, which included the average teacher wage, student teacher 
ratio, spending on administration, spending on instructional supplies and operating 
expenses were found to be statistically insignificant. The results indicate that a 10% hike 
in the minimum wage caused school enrollment to reduce by 0.8 percent for 16-year-old 
males, 1.4 percent for 17-year-old males and 1.7 percent for 17-year-old females. 
The enrollment measure used by Landon (1997) may need to be expanded to 
include enrollment rates by grade as opposed to enrollment rates by age. Enrollment rates 
by grade may better capture the effect of the minimum wage on schooling since it 
measures the effect of the minimum wage for definite groups of people.  
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Chapter 3 
Theoretical Framework 
3.1 Employment Effect of the Minimum Wage 
In this section, we analyze the theory supporting the textbook evidence of the effect 
of the minimum wage on employment. Section 3.1.1 discusses the competitive market 
view, while section 3.1.2 looks at the monopsonistic view of a minimum wage effect. 
3.1.1 The Competitive Model of Labour Supply and Demand 
The competitive model of labour supply is the most basic model for analyzing the 
impact of a change in the minimum wage on such labour market variables as employment 
and participation rates. In this model, the market-clearing wage rate (WE) and quantity of 
labour (QE) is determined by the intersection of labour demand and supply curves (DL 
and SL in Figure 3.1). This model assumes that homogeneity exists between all jobs and 
workers. It also assumes the employer to be a price taker. In reality, there are different 
categories of workers and jobs each commanding a different wage rate. Models of 
heterogeneous labour supply have been studied over the years for examples see Brown, et 
al, (1982) and Card and Krueger (1995).  
Figure 3.1 below shows the upward sloping labour supply curve (SL) that signifies 
an increase in labour market participation with an increase in wage rate. The marginal 
productivity of labour diminishes as wage rate rises thereby making labour less 
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affordable. The downward sloping labour demand curve (DL = value marginal product) 
signifies the labour demand reduction that follows an increase in the wage rate.  
The imposition of a minimum wage (MW) above the market-clearing wage (WE) 
leads to a decline in employment as the employee’s value marginal product falls below 
the minimum wage. In addition, the increase in participation rates that follows this wage 
increase creates an unemployment rates increase. Fig 3.1 below presents a graphical 
representation of the effect of the minimum wage (MW) in a competitive labour market 
with complete coverage of the minimum wage.  
Figure 3.1: Minimum Wage in a Competitive Market 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Adapted from McConnell and Brue (1995) 
 
The levels of employment at the equilibrium (market) and minimum wage at MW1 
are QE and QM1 respectively. Notice from the graph that the minimum wage creates loss 
of jobs by the amount ab, as labour demand decreases to QM1 thereby increasing 
participation by bc and causing unemployment by the amount ac. If this minimum wage 
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were well below the equilibrium wage, the allocation effects described in this analysis 
would not hold.  
An increase in the minimum wage from MW1 to MW2 causes unemployment to 
increase to df and participation by ef. Textbook prediction therefore, in the context of the 
competitive model described above is that a minimum wage increase reduces 
employment and increases labour market participation rates. 
 Whether these theoretical assumptions actually reflect what goes on in reality with 
an imposition of the minimum wage is left to be seen from the results of this study. 
Existing empirical evidence as detailed in the literature review conducted in chapter 2 
shows conflicting results as to the labour market allocation effects of the minimum wage 
legislation. 
3.1.2 Minimum Wage and Monopsony 
Monopsony is simply defined as a market with a single buyer of labour. The 
monopsonist faces an upward sloping labour supply curve (SL=AC (average cost)) and in 
the absence of a minimum wage law, the monopsonist sets the wage rate (WO) to be 
commensurate with the quantity of labour he needs to hire (QO in Figure 3.2 below). This 
wage is determined by the average cost of labour (AC) at that level of employment where 
the marginal revenue product (MRP) equals the marginal cost of labour (MC).  
The non-discriminating monopsonist pays the same wage rate to all employees 
and finds that his extra cost of hiring one more worker (MC), is greater than the wage 
paid to that worker (AC). In the event of a minimum wage legislation where the imposed 
minimum wage (MW1) is above the monopsonists wage rate (WO), the monopsonist’s 
average cost and marginal cost schedules become equal at the level of the minimum 
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wage. After the optimal hiring point (Q1), the two schedules (MC and AC) return to their 
old shapes. Beyond (Q1), the monopsonist will have to raise his wage rate if he needs to 
hire more workers. 
Figure 3.2: Minimum Wage in the Monopsonistic Market (Case 1) 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Adapted from McConnell and Brue (1995) 
 
The monopsonist maximizes profit by equating his marginal cost (MC=MW1abMC) 
to his marginal revenue product (MRP) at the same level with Q1. Hence this minimum 
wage imposition had the effect of increasing employment from Q0 to Q1. Figure 3.2 above 
represents the effect of an increase in the minimum wage in a monopsonitic market with 
minimum wage levels below the competitive wage and the point of intersection of the 
MC and MRP curves. An increase in the minimum wage from MW1 to MW2 has the 
effect of increasing employment from Q1 to Q2 where the now horizontal marginal cost 
curve meets the marginal revenue product schedule. 
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Figure 3.3 below labeled as Case 2 represents the effect of an increase in the 
minimum wage for a monopsonist and in a situation where the initial minimum wage is 
on the level of the competitive wage. The effects of changes in the minimum wage are 
analyzed at and above the point where the MC curve intersects with the MRP curve.  
At MW1, employment is at Q1. An increase in the minimum wage from MW1 to 
MW2 shifts the MC schedule to MW2bMC. The point, at which the new MC schedule 
meets the MRP schedule, represents the optimal hiring position for the monopsonist (Q0). 
A further increase in the minimum wage to MW3 leads to a reduction in employment 
from Q0 to Q3 as the new MC curve MW3 meets the MRP curve. 
Figure 3.3: Minimum Wage in the Monopsonistic Market (Case 2) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Adapted from McConnell and Brue (1995) 
 
We can therefore conclude that the textbook evidence of the effect of the minimum 
wage in a monopsonistic market is either positive or negative and depends on the level of 
change in the minimum wage. Therefore the question of the effect of minimum wage on 
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the level of employment in the labour market remains an empirical one. In the same vein, 
since the employer raises his wage rate, labour force participation could increase in a bid 
to take advantage of the wage increases. 
From the analysis carried out in this section, we see that the textbook evidence of the 
impact of the minimum wage on employment is either a positive or negative one. The 
direction depends on the type of labour market under consideration. Such extreme market 
forms rarely exist in the real world but different combinations of these forms can be 
found to exist. 
 
3.2 Participation Decision 
In this section, we explore some textbook evidence of the effect of the minimum 
wage on participation rates. Subsection 3.2.1 looks at the labour-leisure choice model, 
while 3.2.2 discusses discouraged and added worker effects. 
3.2.1 Labour-Leisure Choice Model 
In this model, the individual relies on his preferences for consumption goods (C) and 
leisure-time (L), which is a complement of labor supply to maximize his utility (U). 
Given his objective function U(C, L); the individual faces a number of constraints among 
which are the price of leisure (the wage rate) and the price of consumption goods. He 
then allocates time in each period between work and leisure and assuming all sources and 
use of funds have been exhausted, the constraints faced by the individual is represented 
by the following relationship: 
 
PC = WH + V                            (3.1) 
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Where P is the price of a unit of consumption, C is a unit of consumption, W is wage rate 
(price of a unit of leisure), H is an hour of work, and V is non-labor income. Equation 3.1 
above represents the equality between the total expenditure in goods and income. Given 
the wage rate, the individual decides whether to work or not and declines any offer to 
work if the wage rate is below his reservation wage. Reservation wage is defined as the 
wage rate below, which the individual chooses not to participate (Killingsworth, 1983). 
 The consumer preferences can be graphically represented by indifference curves. 
Budget constraints are also used to demonstrate the individual’s ability to choose from a 
range of work-leisure bundles depending on the wage rate available to the individual. The 
marginal rate of substitution for an individual depicts how much value he places on 
leisure time as opposed to work. A steep indifference curve as shown in Figure 3.4 and 
3.5 below depicts an individual who requires a large amount of consumption in order to 
give up any additional leisure time. The market wage rate measures his ability to 
exchange leisure for income.  
To maximize his utility, the individual will reach the highest possible indifference 
curve as constrained by his income. In the non-participant case, given MW1 wage rate, 
highest level of utility possible is achieved at point (A) where the budget line meets the 
highest attainable indifference curve corresponding to maximum leisure (T), or zero 
hours of work. This is a corner solution since the equilibrium position occurs at one of 
the two extreme points on the budget line.  
An increase in the minimum wage from MW1 to MW2 provides an incentive to the 
individual to participate in the labour market. This final decision is different for every 
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individual and the results are a function of his preferences, embodied in his indifference 
curves and also on the income and substitution effects of a wage change.  The individual 
could become participant on AB segment (see Figure 3.4) or remain non-participant at 
point A (see Figure 3.5). 
Figure 3.4: Non-Participant Equilibrium (Case 1)         
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Adapted from Killingsworth (1983) 
 
Figure 3.5: Non-Participant Equilibrium (Case 2) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Adapted from Killingsworth (1983) 
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Figure 3.6 below represents a participant situation. In this interior solution, the 
equilibrium position (E) is achieved at the point of tangency between the budget line and 
the highest attainable indifference curve (Benjamin et al, 1998). For the participant, a 
minimum wage increase takes the individual to a higher indifference curve (IC2) and a 
new equilibrium position (F). A number of unique possibilities exist for the individual, 
and these depend on his preferences as well as on the income and substitution effects of a 
wage change. For the participant, there is never an option to drop out of the work force. 
Figure 3.6: Participant Equilibrium 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Adapted from Killingsworth (1983) 
Overall, textbook evidence on the effect of minimum wage hikes on labour 
market participation is conclusive. The effect is an increase in labour market 
participation. 
3.2.2 Discouraged/ Added Worker Effect 
People’s decision to participate in the labour force can also be affected by the 
state of the economy. This is evident in business cycle fluctuations and can be described 
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in the context of two important phenomena known as the discouraged and the added 
worker effects. The discouraged worker effect suggests that during a cyclical downturn 
participation rates decline. The rationale for the discouraged worker effect as suggested 
by McConnell and Brue (1995) is that expected wage rates (which represent the price of 
leisure) fall in these times thereby making leisure more affordable. Also when the 
probability of job finding falls, expected wage rates are low. 
Killingsworth (1983) on the other hand describes this phenomenon in the context 
of reservation wages. He claims that during a cyclical downturn, a larger proportion of 
people get wage offers lower than their reservation wage and as a result of this, the 
participation rate falls since people will not work for wages below their reservation wage. 
The added-worker effect on the other hand has the opposite effect on labour market 
participation of affected workers. It involves spouses who become labour market 
participants to maintain their current standard of living after their spouses become 
unemployed Killingsworth (1983).  
To determine the dominant phenomenon, some empirical work would be required. In 
general research shows that higher unemployment rates are accompanied by lower 
participation rates. McConnell and Brue (1995) suggest that the discouraged worker 
effect dominates because it is more representative of behavior in a majority of 
households. This is because these households may contain children as the unemployed 
members who may derive more benefit from attending school than joining the workforce 
to earn minimum wages. 
Therefore based on all the textbook evidence given in this section, we can conclude 
that the effect of a minimum wage hike on participation rates is inconclusive. This effect 
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depends largely on the individual’s choice based on his preferences and on the state of 
the economy. 
 
3.3 Enrollment Decision 
 This section analyses the theory surrounding the effect of the minimum wage on 
enrollment rates. This will be done in the framework of the individual’s choice of human 
capital investment model. A brief review of human capital theory will also be discussed 
in subsection 3.3.1. 
3.3.1 Human Capital Theory 
Adam Smith (1776) recognized that a nation’s capital stock is made up of both human 
and physical capital and made comparisons between these two forms of capital. He 
pointed out that human capital as well as physical capital both involve costs and provide 
an opportunity for improved productivity for the individual and the nation alike. Some 
early works (Denison, 1962; Becker, 1962 and Mincer 1962) upheld this view and 
assumed that a large proportion of the income differentials observed in their studies was 
due to differences in educational attainment. Ben-Porath (1967) developed a model to 
demonstrate how various aspects of the production function affect an individuals lifetime 
earnings. He sought with the use of this model to examine the relationship between the 
accumulation of human capital and the lifetime of earnings. 
3.3.2 Individual’s Choice of Human Capital Investment 
The individual exists within a lifetime objective function, which he seeks to 
maximize. He has a choice to make between investing in his human capital, and joining 
the labour market. The rationale behind human capital theory is the improvement of 
  
 
42
productivity and earnings through human capital investment. Education, which is a well-
known form of human capital investment, involves both direct and indirect costs of 
schooling in the form of forgone earnings. The individual’s decision to acquire additional 
education will be based on a cost-benefit analysis to determine how profitable additional 
education might be to him in terms of higher productivity and future earnings. He would 
need to gather all the information he needs to conduct this analysis to avoid ignoring 
hidden costs and benefits, which might make enormous differences in any conclusion 
made.   
In order to decide, the individual compares the direct and indirect costs of investment 
with the benefits that could accrue from this investment. He/ she should invest if the 
present value of costs involved is less than the present value of benefits. The decisive 
factor for making an investment is based mostly on the internal rate of return, which is 
defined as the breakeven discount rate that equates the present value of costs and the 
present value of benefits. If the individual’s internal rate of return is greater than the 
market rate of interest plus a risk premium, then he finds it profitable to invest, as his 
present value of benefits is greater than the present value of costs. 
Given the internal rate of return, the individual has a rate of time preference (∆), 
which makes him indifferent between the present and the future. The value of ∆ is 
subjective and differs from one individual to the next. If ∆ = 0.10 or 10%, then a dollar 
now is equivalent to $1.10 ($1 + 10% of a dollar) next year. Present oriented people have 
higher ∆’s and vice-versa for future oriented people. The individual’s decision to invest 
will now depend on a comparison between his internal rate of return and his rate of time 
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preference. If his rate of time preference (∆) is less than his internal rate of return (IRR), 
the individual may decide to invest.  
Figure 3.7 Earnings Profiles for Grades Eleven and Twelve 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Adapted from Polachek and Siebert (1993) 
 
Figure 3.7 above shows the earning profiles for grades eleven and twelve. It presents 
choices for an individual - to work or to continue attending high school up until grade 12. 
If the individual works, he earns $G in the beginning and Y1 grade 11 by the end of his 
working career. On the other hand, if he decides to attend grade 12 and possibly graduate, 
he would have negative earnings in the beginning (-$C) as a result of the additional costs 
(both direct and indirect) incurred in that additional year. However, after he graduates, his 
earnings eventually rise to Y grade 12. Therefore, attending one more year of high school 
is beneficial as future earnings are enhanced by the vertical distance between OA and OB 
(Polachek and Siebert, 1993). 
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However, a minimum wage increase will have the effect of raising the individual’s 
current earnings to H at the present and eventually to Y2 grade 11.  Y2 grade 11 may be 
on the same level as Y1 grade 11 because the minimum wage may eventually stop rising 
after it reaches a certain level in the individuals lifetime. In the same vein the indirect 
costs encountered if he chooses to attend school at the present rises from GOFE to 
HMFE. The individual may need to reevaluate his choice to work or not given the 
additional costs and benefits presented by the wage increase. A wage increase therefore 
may have the effect of either increasing or reducing grade twelve enrollments depending 
on the individual’s considerations. 
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Chapter 4 
Specification, Data, and Descriptive Statistics 
In order to estimate the impact of the minimum wage on high school enrollment, 
employment and participation rates, we have estimated our regressions using the panel 
data technique. A number of reasons influenced the choice of panel data for carrying out 
this study. Firstly, minimum wage in Canada is under provincial jurisdiction unlike in the 
United States where it is under federal jurisdiction. Secondly, enough heterogeneity 
exists in minimum wage data in the different Canadian provinces to allow for this kind of 
study. Thirdly, due to data limitations, the choice of panel data would greatly increase the 
number of observations used and the power of the regression. Fourthly, the need for 
analyzing aggregate employment, labour force participation and enrollment for 
successive changes in the minimum wage also justifies the use of panel data. Lastly, the 
other techniques (time series and natural experiments, etc) all have inherent 
shortcomings, which could be mitigated by the use of panel data. This chapter discusses 
the four different specifications that have been employed, the estimation techniques, data 
used for this study and a detailed description of the data. 
 
 4.1 Alternative Specifications 
Four different specifications have been used to carry out this study. Firstly, a level 
specification is used to estimate the effect of the minimum wage on schooling 
continuation ratios, enrollment, employment and participation rates. Continuation ratios 
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measure the tendency for one to move to the next grade. Equation 4.1 below presents a 
general form of this specification: 
 
Yit = Bo + Bm MWit + BxXit + et                                       (4.1) 
 
Where Yit is the enrollment, continuation, employment or participation rate in 
state i and in period t. MWit is the minimum wage variable. Xit is a set of independent 
variables including the prime aged male unemployment rate, gross domestic product, and 
population ratio just to mention a few. Bo, Bm and Bx are the regression coefficients for 
the intercept, minimum wage and other independent variables in the regression while et is 
the stochastic error term. 
 The second specification is the differenced specification. In this specification, first 
differences of the data are taken with a loss of the first observation. This panel data 
technique is particularly advantageous as it helps eliminate the incidence of highly 
persistent time series processes. The intercept from this regression represents the change 
in the intercept from one period to the other. Equation 4.2 below presents a general form 
of this specification: 
 
∆Yit = B0 + Bm∆MWit + Bx∆Xit + ∆et                               (4.2) 
 
Where ∆Yit is the change in the dependent variable in state i and in period t from 
one year to the other. ∆MWit is the change in the minimum wage variable from one year 
to the other. ∆Xit is the change in the set of independent variables from one year to the 
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other. ∆et represents the change in the stochastic error term. B0 represents the intercept 
coefficient, which in this specification is the change in the intercept from one year to the 
other. 
 The third and fourth specifications are both level estimates with a fixed effect 
specification where the former does not include any trend terms and the latter includes a 
quadratic trend. Quadratic trends were chosen to account for the unusual trending pattern 
of the data. Unobserved factors that may affect the outcome of our regressions exist 
between the provinces. These specifications will help account for those factors to help 
arrive at more efficient estimators. General forms of these two specifications are 
presented in equations (4.3) and (4.4) below: 
  
Yit = ai + BmMWit + BxXit + eit                                    (4.3) 
 
Yit = ai + BmMWit + BxXit + + Btt + Bt2t2 + eit           (4.4) 
 
Where ai represents province fixed effects estimated as dummy provinces for each 
province. The t and t2 represent trend and trend-squared which together constitute a 
quadratic trend. Bt and Bt2 represent the regression coefficients for the trend and trend 
squared. 
 
4.2 Estimation of the Employment Equation 
In this section, we present our empirical specification for estimating the 
relationship between the minimum wage and employment, conditioning on a set of 
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explanatory variables. Data definitions and sources as well as discussions are also 
included. 
4.2.1 Employment Specification 
 After some adjustments were made to the general form of the equation used by 
Ragan (1977), Mincer (1976) and Baker and Stanger (1999) to suit the purpose of this 
research, the employment equation which is an adaptation of the first specification (level) 
has the following form: 
 
(EMPR)it = B0 + B1 (MINW)it + B2(GDP)it + B3 (UNPR)it + B4 (POPBRW)it + uit  (4.5) 
 
∀ i = 1,…….., 10, ∀ t = 1,…….., 20 
Where: (EMPR)it is the employment rate in the ith province at time t; (MINW)it is 
minimum wage in the ith province at time t controlled for inflation using the provincial 
consumer price index; (GDP)it is the real per capita Gross Domestic Product for the ith 
province at time t in thousands of dollars deflated by the provincial consumer price index 
in 1992 constant dollars; (UNPR)it is the unemployment rate for prime age males (25–54 
years) for the ith province at time t; and (POPBRW)it is the population of the relevant age 
group expressed as a percentage of the total working age population (15-64 years) for the 
ith province at time t.   
The minimum wage coefficient (B1) should show the relationship between the 
minimum wage and employment. The expected sign for this coefficient remains a puzzle 
considering the variation in the results from the minimum wage literature studied in 
chapter 2. This result is also expected to vary with the demographic group being studied. 
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Lester (1964) believed that a minimum wage increase could increase employment if it 
reduces labour turnover and improves productivity. On the other hand, Stigler (1946) 
believed that a minimum wage increase caused a decline in employment among workers 
earning below the proposed minimum. The minimum wage variable is deflated by the 
consumer price index. Results from previous studies show that using different minimum 
wage deflators make no difference in the inference, see Baker and Stanger 1999. This 
equation is an adaptation of the model used by Baker and Stanger (1999). Differences 
exist between the definition of the minimum wage variable used by Baker and Stanger 
and the one used in this study. They used a minimum wage variable with the same form 
as the Kaitz index while the minimum wage variable used here is the real minimum 
wage. 
Priori expectations are that the coefficient for the Gross Domestic Product (B2) 
should be positive. This variable was included to capture the cyclical effects of the 
economy on the employment rate. The unemployment rate of prime age males in the 
economy was also included to capture the cyclical effects of labour demand conditions. 
This variable has been used in several past studies and has often been shown to have a 
good explanatory power. The expected sign for the coefficient of this variable (B3) is 
negative as the variable reflects the level of demand for employment in the economy.  
It’s expected that the coefficient for the population of the relevant age group 
expressed as a percentage of the total working age population (B4) will be positive since 
an increase in the relative supply of any group is likely to increase the rate at which they 
are employed. This is true because an increase in the relative supply of each group 
reduces the competition faced by that group from the other age groups. This will be 
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especially true if a high rate of job substitution exists between the different demographic 
groups. This variable is included in order to capture the supply-side effects of 
employment. This is necessary since the level of employment in any economy is 
determined by an interaction between demand and supply. A number of past studies have 
used the enrollment rate as a supply variable to capture this effect. This was not a 
consideration in this study, as enrollment rates are believed to be correlated with the 
minimum wage. Including this variable as an independent variable may create 
multicollinearity in the employment equation. The coefficient in the trend terms should 
show the rate at which the dependent variable changes on average from one period to the 
other all things being equal.  
The alternative specifications discussed in section 4.1 above will be employed to 
run the regressions for the ‘both sexes’, male and female demographic groups before 
arriving at a conclusion. Also the minimum wage effect on employment will be estimated 
for males, females and both sexes in the 15-19, 15-24, 20-24 and 25-54 demographic 
groups in order to capture the differentials that may exist between these groups. 
4.2.2 Employment Equation: Data and Sources 
Data used in this study was obtained from the Canadian Socio-Economic 
Information Management system (CANSIM), Statistics Canada publications and Human 
Resources Development Canada (HRDC). Data ranges from 1981 to 2000 per province. 
See Appendix C for the complete series numbers of all the CANSIM data used. 
Employment Rate:  
This is the September value of employment rate for the different demographic 
groups (males, females and both sexes in the 15-19, 15-24, 20-24 and 25-54 age groups). 
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September value was used because September exemplifies the start of the school year. 
Data was obtained from CANSIM.  
Minimum Wage: 
This is the adult hourly minimum wage rate. The relevant minimum wage rate for 
the workers under federal jurisdiction is the adult minimum wage in the province where 
the job is held. For most provinces differential wage rates do not exist for youths and 
even when they exist is not significantly different from the adult minimum wage thereby 
justifying the use of the adult wage rate. Data used in this study was obtained through a 
special inquiry from Human Resources Development Canada website (2003). A number 
of the provinces under study operated with more than one minimum rate in the same 
calendar year in the period under study. When this is the case, the minimum rate to be 
used in any particular year will be that in existence in the month of September for the 
particular jurisdiction.  
Gross Domestic Product: 
This is the annual real per capita Provincial Gross Domestic Product in thousands 
of dollars deflated by the Provincial Consumer Price Index in 1992 constant dollars. Both 
series of data were obtained from CANSIM. 
The Prime-age Male Unemployment Rate:  
This is the September value of unemployment rate for males between 25 and 54 
years. Data was obtained from CANSIM. 
Population:  
These are the annual population estimates. Population ratios were calculated using 
these population estimates. Data was obtained from CANSIM. 
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4.2.3 Employment Equation: Descriptive Statistics 
Table 4.1 below presents the descriptive statistics for the variables used to estimate 
the employment equation.  
Table 4.1: Employment Equation: Descriptive Statistics 
Statistics Variable/ Age group 
Mean Standard Deviation 
MINW1 5.173609 0.486258 
EMPRB (15-19) 39.93300 9.708780 
EMPRM (15-19) 40.78550 10.55225 
EMPRF (15-19) 39.07100 9.606199 
EMPRB (15-24) 53.19750  8.574137 
EMPRM (15-24) 54.98150 9.339719 
EMPRF (15-24) 51.32100 8.290278 
EMPRB (20-24) 66.03450 7.304742 
EMPRM (20-24) 68.93150 8.123863 
EMPRF (20-24) 63.02950  7.211958 
EMPRB (25-54) 74.88950 6.936926 
EMPRM (25-54) 84.42850 6.294788 
EMPRF (25-54) 65.33350 9.013576 
UNRP 7.953254 2.974576 
GDP2 22501.32 4908.753 
POPBRW (15-19) 0.138295 0.080062 
POPMRW (15-19) 0.070934 0.041036 
POPFRW (15-19) 0.067375 0.039024 
POPBRW (15-24) 0.280617 0.157108 
POPMRW (15-24) 0.143341 0.080216 
POPFRW (15-24) 0.137283 0.076908 
POPBRW (20-24) 0.142318 0.077860 
POPMRW (20-24) 0.072410 0.039632 
POPFRW (20-24) 0.069911 0.038247 
POPBRW (25-54) 0.806984 0.494740 
POPMRW (25-54) 0.406110 0.248920 
POPFRW (25-54) 0.400876  0.245893 
1Minimum wage described is the real minimum wage deflated by Consumer Price Index 
2Gross Domestic Product is per capita GDP in thousands of dollars 
Variables have been defined in table 1 
Source: Author’s compilation from regression data 
 
 A table with the definitions of the acronyms included in this table of descriptive 
statistics and in all sections of this thesis can be found in Table 1. The mean population 
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ratios and employment rates for each of the age-sex groups as well as the mean GDP and 
UNRP are the simple means of the two hundred pooled provincial time-series for the 
1981 to 2000 time period. Notice that the mean employment rates and population ratios 
for males are higher than that for females for all age groups. Also for employment rates, 
the means tend to increase with the older age groups. 
 
4.3 Estimation of the Labour Market Participation Equation 
This section presents the empirical specification for estimating the relationship 
between the minimum wage and labour force participation, conditioning on a set of 
explanatory variables as well as data definitions and sources. 
4.3.1 Participation Specification 
The empirical specification for the participation equation is expected to be no 
different from that of employment as the same variables affect both employment and 
participation rates. Therefore an adjustment of the specification of the employment 
equation in Equation 4.5 above is used to estimate the effect of the minimum wage on 
participation rates. This model is also similar to the models employed by Swidinsky 
(1980) and Schaasfsma and Walsh (1983) with the exception of the fact that Swidinsky 
used region dummies as opposed to province dummies and Schaasfsma and Walsh 
excluded the prime aged male unemployment rate as an explanatory variable. The 
following is the participation equation: 
 
(PARTR)it = B0 + B1 (MINW)it + B2(GDP)it + B3 (UNPR)it + B4 (POPBRW)it + uit  (4.6) 
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∀ i = 1,…….., 10, ∀ t = 1,…….., 20 
Where (PARTR)it  is the participation rate of the relevant demographic group in province 
i and in time t. 
The expected sign for the minimum wage coefficient (B1) in the participation 
equation remains a puzzle just like in the employment equation because of the results 
derived in past studies even though textbook evidence showed the participation rate to 
increase with an increase in wages. The coefficient on Gross Domestic Product (B2) is 
expected to be positive as participation rates should increase with the Gross Domestic 
Product, which indicates how buoyant the economy is at any particular point in time. The 
coefficient on the unemployment rate of prime aged males (B3) is expected to be negative 
as the variable should be a good indicator of how many jobs there are to go round all 
labour force participants.  
It’s expected that the coefficient for the population of the relevant age group 
expressed as a percentage of the total working age population (B4) will be positive since 
an increase in the relative supply of any group is likely to increase the rate at which they 
participate in the labour force. 
A big challenge in minimum wage studies is determining which explanatory 
variables to use during regressions. F-tests for exclusion restrictions were used to identify 
which variables to include in the regression model for the employment and participation 
regressions. Results of the F-test showed the Population parameter (POPRW) and the real 
per capita GDP variables to have an effect on employment and participation rates after 
Minimum wage and Unemployment rates of prime aged males had been controlled for. 
Also F-tests to check the overall significance of the regression showed that the 
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independent variables help to explain the dependent variables in these regressions. This 
in addition to the significant t-statistics derived from these additional parameters leads us 
to conclude that inclusion of these variables were a step in the right direction for 
obtaining an unbiased minimum wage coefficient. The minimum wage effect on 
participation rates will be estimated for males, females and both sexes in the 15-19, 15-
24, 20-24 and 25-54 demographic groups. 
The participation rate persisting in September was obtained from CANSIM. 
Explanatory variables are the same for the employment equation discussed in the 
previous section. Table 4.2 below shows the descriptive statistics peculiar to the variables 
included in the participation equation. 
4.3.2 Participation Equation: Descriptive Statistics 
Table 4.2 below presents the descriptive statistics (means and standard deviations) 
peculiar to the participation equation. 
Table 4.2: Participation Equation: Descriptive Statistics 
Statistics Variable/ Age group 
Mean Standard Deviation 
PARTRB (15-19) 48.35500 9.550620 
PARTRM (15-19) 49.80050 10.09478 
PARTRF (15-19) 47.10950 9.186097 
PARTRB (15-24) 62.67750 7.397517 
PARTRM (15-24) 65.36000 7.971961 
PARTRF (15-24) 59.98800 7.411702 
PARTRB (20-24) 76.49053 5.316801 
PARTRM (20-24) 80.23895 5.809157 
PARTRF (20-24) 72.64632 5.633673 
PARTRB (25-54) 82.39800 4.584965 
PARTRM (25-54) 92.11000 3.289285 
PARTRF (25-54) 72.67700 7.432076 
Variables have been defined in Table 1 
Source: Author’s compilation from regression data 
 
The mean participation rates for each of the age-sex groups are the simple means 
of the two hundred pooled provincial time-series for the 1981 to 2000 time period. The 
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mean participation rates tend to increase with the higher age groups and are higher for 
males than for females in each category. 
 
4.4 Estimation of the Enrollment Equation 
In this section, we present our empirical specification for estimating the relationship 
between the minimum wage, high school enrolment and high school continuation ratios 
conditioning on a set of explanatory variables. Also included are data definitions and 
sources.  
4.4.1 Enrollment Specification 
To estimate the effect of minimum wages on school enrollment, grade ten, eleven 
and twelve enrollment rates were used as dependent variables conditioning on a set of 
explanatory variables. This model included three additional variables to those used in the 
employment and participation equations. These additional variables were some of the   
sixteen explanatory variables used by Landon (1997) to estimate the effect of the 
minimum wage on enrollment rates by age groups. The choice of these additional 
variables was influenced by necessity as well as the significant results obtained from 
these variables in Landon’s study. The following model will be estimated to determine 
the direction of the relationship between the minimum wage and school enrollment for 
high-schoolers: 
 
(ENRR)it = B0 + B1(MINW)it + B2(GDP)it + B3(UNPR)it + B4(POPBRW)it +     
B5(STRATIO)it + B6(AVAGE)it + B7(DIV)it + uit                      (4.7)       
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∀ i = 1,…….., 10, ∀ t = 1,…….., 20 
Where:  (ENRR)it is the enrollment rate for the ith province at time t; (POPBRW)it is the 
population of teens expressed as a percentage of the total working population; 
(STRATIO)it is the student teacher ratio for the ith province at time t; (AVAGE)it is the 
average age of teachers for the ith province at time t; (DIV)it is the divorce rate for the ith 
province at time t. 
The expected sign for the minimum wage coefficient (B1) is as much a puzzle as it 
is for the employment equation. For the minimum wage to affect school enrollment, it has 
to affect labour market variables such as employment and participation rates. Two 
different rationales exist for explaining the possible impact of the minimum wage on 
school enrollment. One is the rationale that an increased minimum wage leads to a 
heightened level of competitiveness in the job market for the few available jobs hence 
keeping teenagers in school (Ehrenberg and Marcus, 1980). The second rationale for a 
positive relationship between the minimum wage and school enrollment has to do with 
requirements for greater human capital investment in the event of a minimum wage hike. 
Employers may require workers with greater levels of productivity when a minimum 
wage is increased (Agell and Lommerud, 1995). An increase in the minimum wage can 
discourage teenagers who mostly are in the minimum wage bracket based on their level 
of experience from seeking jobs. This is because the textbook description of the impact of 
the minimum wage on employment rates may give them an incentive to remain in school, 
as there may only be few options available to them. On the other hand, an increase in the 
minimum wage may serve to decrease school enrollment rates as the increase in wage 
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experienced by an increase in minimum wage raises the opportunity cost of education 
(Neumark and Wascher, 1995b).  
The coefficient on Gross Domestic Product (B2) is expected to be negative, as a 
buoyant economy may be an incentive for teenagers to desire work more than schooling. 
The unemployment rate of prime aged males in the economy is expected to have a 
positive coefficient (B3). In this study, a rise in this variable would encourage students to 
enroll in school since the probability of their finding jobs is reduced. It’s expected that 
the coefficient for the population of the relevant age group expressed as a percentage of 
the total working age population (B4) will be negative. This is because as the proportion 
of teens to the working age population increases, competition for available jobs is less 
from other demographic groups so enrollment is expected to decrease. 
The student teacher ratio (STRATIO) was included to capture any effect that 
education spending may have on school enrollment. This variable is expected to be 
negatively correlated with school enrollment as one will expect that if the student teacher 
ratio increases then fewer students would want to be enrolled since the quality and 
efficiency of the instruction they may receive may decline. The average age of teachers 
(AVAGE) was included as proxy for teacher experience. This same variable was used by 
Landon (1997) in his work ‘High School Enrollment, minimum Wages and Education 
Spending’. If the average age of teachers is high, then the teachers are likely to be more 
experienced and this therefore could create an incentive for students to remain in school. 
The divorce rate variable (DIV) was included in order to capture the impact the social 
structure of the economy may have on school enrollment. The expectation is that an 
increase in the divorce rate in the economy will result in a decline in school enrollment as 
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divorce may have the effect of allowing teenagers with choices that normally would not 
have existed for them if their parents were together. 
F-tests were conducted to prove that the three additional variables to be included 
in the enrollment equations; Average age of teachers (AVAGE), Divorce rate (DIV) and 
Student teacher ratio (STRATIO) were necessary to explain the variation in school 
enrollment after all the afore mentioned variables had been controlled for. Also F-tests to 
check the overall significance of these regressions showed that the variables do explain 
the variations in school enrollment. 
4.4.2 Enrollment Data and Sources 
Enrollment Data:  
Data for high school enrollment of teenagers was obtained from the statistics 
Canada publications: elementary-secondary enrollment 1981-82 to 91-92 with Catalogue 
number   81-210 for the 81-82 to 91-92 school years, education in Canada a statistical 
review with Catalogue No. 81-229-XIB for the 1992-93 to 95-96 school years and from 
education in -Canada 1996 to 2000 with Cat. No.81-229 for the 96-97 to 98-99 school 
years. Note the data limitation with enrollment data which is only available from 1981-82 
to 1998-1999 school years. This reduces the number of observations for the enrollment 
and continuation ratio observations by twenty. Also note that data segregation by male 
and female enrollment is only available until the 1991-92 school year thereby reducing 
the male and female regressions by seventy more observations. Also, the second 
specification (first differencing) results in the loss of one observation thereby further 
reducing the number of observations. These data limitations will greatly affect the results 
for enrollment and continuation ratios so greater reliance will be placed on results from 
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the ‘both sexes’ specification with data ranging from the 1981-82 to 1998-99 school 
years. 
Student Teacher Ratio:  
Data was obtained from the statistics Canada publication education in Canada: a 
statistical review 1982 to 1991 for the 1981-82 to 1990-91 school years and from 
education in Canada 1996 to 2000 Catalogue No. 81-229-XIB for the 1991-92 to 1998-99 
school years. 
Average Age of Teachers:  
Data was obtained from the statistics Canada publications: education in Canada: a 
statistical review 1982 to 1991 for the 1981-82 to 1990-91 school years and from 
education in Canada 1996 to 2000 for the 91-92 to 98-99 school years.. Data for Quebec 
is missing in the 1981-82 and 1982-83 school years. Also, grade twelve enrollment is not 
available for Quebec in all years. 
Divorce Rate:  
This is the crude divorce rate per 1000 population. Actual data used was for the 
present and two previous years. Data was obtained from the statistics Canada publication 
Vital Statistics marriages and divorces 1985 with Catalogue number 84-205 for 1978 to 
1985 and vital statistics compendium 1996 with Catalogue number 81-214-XIE for 1986 
to 1996 and from CANSIM for 1997 and 1998. 
4.4.3 Enrollment Equation: Descriptive Statistics 
 Table 4.3 below presents the descriptive statistics (mean and standard deviation) 
peculiar to the enrollment equation. 
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Table 4.3: Enrollment Equation: Descriptive Statistics 
Statistics Variable/ Grade 
Mean Standard Deviation 
ENRRB (10)1 49.5720  0.033381 
ENRRM (10) 47.9062  0.035555 
ENRRF (10) 48.8904 0.027873 
ENRRB (11) 46.5413 0.043150 
ENRRM (11) 44.0522 0.046092 
ENRRF (11) 45.8735 0.033834 
ENRRB (12) 51.0093 0.252466 
ENRRM (12) 43.1127  0.072724 
ENRRF (12) 45.2513  0.071908 
AVAGE 40.9781 2.058880 
DIV 7.43436 1.830250 
STRATIO 16.7185 1.180550 
1The school enrollment percentages are expected to be approximately 50% as population figures for two age groups were used to 
calculate the percentages for each age-sex group. 
Variables have been defined in table 1 
Source: Author’s compilation from regression data 
 
 The mean enrollment rates for each of the grade-sex groups are the simple 
means of the one hundred and eighty pooled provincial time-series for the 1981-82 to 
1998-1999 school years. Notice that the mean enrollment rates reduced with an increase 
in grade level. These means tend to be higher for females than it is for males. 
4.4.4 Continuation Ratio Specification 
Grade and overall continuation ratios were also used as measures of school 
enrollment. These same measures were used by Chaplin, et al, (2003) to estimate the 
impact of minimum wage on school enrollment. These grade continuation ratios are 
considered to be good measures as they capture school involvement better than 
enrollment rates which have been used in most previous studies as a measure for school 
enrollment. 
 However, these grade continuation ratios have some drawbacks. One of those is 
that they are affected by students being held back a grade and by students who dropout of 
school. Chaplin, et al, (2003) discovered that being held back a grade was more likely to 
  
 
62
occur than dropping out. Being held back may bias the results because when students are 
held back in a specific grade, they increase the continuation ratio for that grade while 
reducing the continuation ratio for the previous grade. Using overall continuation ratios 
could combat this problem according to the authors, as they will not be affected as such 
by grade retention rates. They would only be influenced by dropouts or as the case may 
be migrants. 
We will have to assume that migration is not correlated with the minimum wage 
variable since we are not including it as an independent variable. Out of province 
migrations tend to be expensive and will be unlikely to occur just in an attempt to take 
advantage of a few cents change in the minimum wage. Overall continuation ratio will 
account for skipped grades but not migration (Chaplin et al, 2003).  The following 
models based on the level estimate will be estimated to determine the impact of the 
minimum wage on grade and overall continuation ratios. 
  
(CONR)it = B0 + B1(MINW)it + B2(GDP)it + B3(UNPR)it + B4(POPBRW)it +     
B5(STRATIO)it + B6(AVAGE)it + B7(DIV)it + uit                         (4.8)       
 
(CONBOVER)it = B0 + B1(MINW)it + B2(GDP)it + B3(UNPR)it + B4(POPBRW)it +      
B5(STRATIO)it + B6(AVAGE)it + B7(DIV)it + uit                (4.9)       
 
∀ i = 1,…….., 10, ∀ t = 1,…….., 20 
Where (CONR)it is the continuation ratio in the ith province in time t and 
(CONBOVER)it is the overall continuation ratio in the ith province in time t. Continuation 
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ratios were calculated from enrollment and graduation data. Data for high school 
graduation was obtained from the statistics Canada publication Education Indicators in 
Canada: A Statistical Review for 1981-82 to 1991-92 school years and from education in 
Canada for the 92-93 to 98-99 school years. These grade continuation ratios have been 
defined in table 4.4 below: 
Table 4.4: Grade Continuation Ratios 
Grade 9 - 10 Grade 10 enrollment in year t/ year t-1 grade 9 enrollment 
Grade 10 - 11 Grade 11 enrollment in year t/ year t-1 grade 10 enrollment 
Grade 11 - 12 Grade 12 enrollment in year t/ year t-1 grade 11 enrollment 
Overall Graduates in year t-1 + grade 10 – 12 in year t/ grade 9-12 in year t-1 
Source: Chaplin, et al, (2003) 
 
4.4.5 Continuation Ratio Equations: Descriptive Statistics 
This section presents some descriptive statistics peculiar to the continuation ratio 
specifications. 
Table 4.5: Continuation Ratio: Descriptive Statistics 
Statistics Variable/ Grade 
Mean Standard Deviation 
CONRB (10-11) 0.950049 0.055599 
CONRM (10-11) 0.935583 0.067389 
CONRF (10-11) 0.951154 0.049833 
CONRB (11-12) 1.072061 0.491906 
CONRM (11-12) 0.975337 0.149373 
CONRF (11-12) 0.991801 0.142146 
CONRB (12-G) 1.253409  0.519075 
CONBOVER 0.913333  0.159729 
Variables have been defined in table 1 
Source: Author’s compilation from regression data 
 
The mean continuation ratios for each of the grade-sex groups are the simple 
means of the one hundred and seventy pooled provincial time-series calculated from the 
1981-82 to 1998-1999 school years. The continuation ratios tend to increase for the 
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higher grade levels and female grades 10-11 and 11-12 continuation ratios tend to be 
higher than that for their male counterparts. 
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Chapter 5 
Econometric Results and Interpretations 
This chapter presents and analyses the results derived in the course of this 
research. Section 5.1 presents the alternative specifications used to conduct this research 
as well as some econometric problems encountered. Section 5.2 presents the detailed 
empirical results obtained. Section 5.3 analyses the minimum wage effect on school 
enrollment, continuation ratios, employment and participation rates. 
 
5.1 Alternative Specifications and Econometric Issues 
The different specifications stated in chapter four (see Equation 4.1 to 4.4) have 
been estimated using the E-views software to determine the effect of the minimum wage 
on the labour market variables being studied. These specifications are level, first 
differenced, level with fixed effects without trend terms and level with fixed effects and a 
quadratic trend. The different specifications in general, are representative of those used 
by early and recent minimum wage researchers. The complete results (using all the above 
mentioned specifications) can be found in the appendix. 
The fourth specification represented in Equation 4.4 is the preferred specification. 
This specification is preferred for a number of reasons. Firstly, the use of a fixed effects 
estimate is appropriate in the given situation as the 10 provinces being studied are under 
different jurisdictions. Allowing different intercepts for each province will help to capture 
the effect of the minimum wage while taking the inherent differences in the provinces 
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into consideration.  In essence, conducting a research of this form without putting this 
fact into consideration can severely bias the results obtained.  
Secondly, the first differenced estimates were mostly statistically insignificant for 
all areas studied. Even though differencing may help reduce the incidence of serial 
correlation in the residuals, it was not favorable because the differencing greatly reduced 
the variation in the minimum wage data thereby making it unreliable for this nature of 
research. Taking longer differences (third, fourth or fifth) would have helped eliminate 
this problem, but this will greatly reduce the number of observations and the power of the 
regression.   
 Thirdly, the choice of the fourth specification was also influenced by the fact that 
most of the data used in this regression exhibited both upward and downward trends at 
different points in the data sets. Quadratic trends were included in the fourth specification 
to help account for the unusual trending nature of the data. Although the results from this 
specification do not differ markedly from the third specification, the fourth specification 
is believed to be a better representation of the minimum wage effect. The trend terms 
TREND and TRENDSQ were mostly found to have significant t-statistics. F-tests carried 
out on this specification also show that the variables included were jointly significant. A 
number of past studies (see Baker and Stanger, 1999) used time dummy variables to 
account for time effects and found that it made no significant difference in the inference. 
Using quadratic trends will help account for those time effects as well as help dilute the 
effect of the trending data. 
 Lastly, results from the regression showed the adjusted R-squared from the 
regressions of the fourth specification to be significantly larger than that of other 
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specifications. The Durbin Watson Statistics from this fourth specification also were 
significantly larger thereby showing a reduction in the positive serial correlation, which 
seemed to be present in the residuals. 
However, serial correlation was a potential problem in the regressions for the 
preferred specification causing the estimators to be inefficient. The Durbin-Watson 
statistics presented in table B.1 in Appendix B show evidence of positive serial 
correlation in the residuals. This statistic assumes that the regressors are strictly 
exogenous (not correlated with the error term in any period) so the t-test for serial 
correlation, shown in table B.2 in the appendix was used to confirm the Durbin-Watson 
test results. This test was suggested by Wooldridge (2003) to be used for testing for the 
presence of serial correlation when regressors are not strictly exogenous. The results from 
this test are also valid if the regressors are strictly exogenous. 
A lag of the dependent variable was included as an explanatory variable in the 
regressions to ascertain if the presence of serial correlation was as a result of the failure to 
capture the complete dynamics of the model. The inclusion of this variable seemed to 
greatly minimize the presence of serial correlation in the residuals as the t-test results for 
the final regression shown in table B.3 in the appendix failed to reject the null of no serial 
correlation. The final regressions with the lagged term were tested for heteroskedasticity 
using the Lagrange Multiplier test suggested by Greene (1993). The results from this test 
are reported in table B.4 in Appendix B and show that the error terms were 
heteroskedastic. Homoskedasticity assumes that the variance of the error term is constant 
across different segments of the population and even though heteroskedasticity does not 
  
 
68
cause bias or inconsistency in results, it could render the statistics used to test hypotheses 
invalid by downwardly biasing the standard errors in some cases (Woolridge, 2003).  
To account for this problem, the White heteroskedasticity robust statistics are 
reported for the regressions with a lag of the dependent variable. This statistic is robust to 
general forms of heteroskedasticity. The regressions with a lagged value of the dependent 
variable have been reported in the body of the thesis while all the other results for the 
four specifications in the study are reported in the appendix. Non-robust statistics are 
reported for the other results in appendix A. 
 
5.2 Empirical Results 
In this section, all regression results based on the preferred specification (fixed 
effects with trend), with a lag of the dependent variable included are presented along with 
discussions of the results.  
5.2.1 Determinants of High School Enrollment Rates 
Results and discussions of estimates obtained from the enrollment specification 
with a lagged term included are presented in this subsection. Different regressions were 
run for the ‘both sexes, male and female demographic groups and for each grade.  
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Table 5.1:  Determinants of Grade 10 enrollment rate 
Explanatory var. Both sexes Male Female  
Dependent Variable: Grade 10 Enrollment 
AB--C 25.715** 52.372*** 67.722*** 
BC--C 24.305** 51.000*** 68.007*** 
MB--C 24.921** 53.184*** 71.165*** 
NB--C 24.130** 52.868*** 70.444*** 
NLD--C 23.251** 66.998** 87.189*** 
NS--C 24.004** 52.062*** 70.244*** 
ONT--C 26.319** 55.184*** 72.077*** 
PEI--C 23.595** 53.140*** 70.799*** 
QUE--C 21.917** 48.364** 68.272*** 
SK--C 25.054** 52.997*** 69.401*** 
MINWAGE 0.031 1.157* 0.126 
UNRP 0.031 0.059 -0.021 
AVAGE -0.021 -0.337 -0.810** 
DIV 0.256 0.407 0.258 
STRATIO -0.232 -0.307 0.158 
GDP1 -0.207*** -0.300** -0.130 
POPBRW2 -4.364 -183.509* -213.350*** 
TREND 0.033 -0.511 -0.462 
TRENDSQ 0.003 0.043* 0.048** 
DEPt-1 0.656*** 0.513*** 0.472*** 
R-squared 0.850 0.800 0.747 
1 Results for GDP were multiplied by 1000 to remove the scaling factor 
2 POPBRW, POPMRW and POPFRW for the ‘both sexes’, male and female groups 
* = 10% level of sig. ** = 5% level of sig. ***=1%level of sig. 2-tailed t tests 
Source: Author’s compilation 
 
Table 5.2:  Determinants of Grade 11 enrollment rate 
Explanatory var. Both sexes Male Female  
Dependent Variable: Grade 11 Enrollment  
AB--C 39.140*** 15.368 66.974*** 
BC--C 38.056*** 12.634 66.762*** 
MB--C 35.559** 10.921 65.405*** 
NB--C 35.610** 10.838 65.678*** 
NLD--C 35.376** 4.1073 70.902** 
NS--C 34.395** 8.379 64.253*** 
ONT--C 38.429*** 13.796 68.945*** 
PEI--C 36.345*** 13.264 68.306*** 
QUE--C 31.560** 4.463 62.755*** 
SK--C 35.976*** 13.153 65.038*** 
MINWAGE 0.058 0.243 0.346 
UNRP 0.019 0.227 0.176** 
AVAGE 0.092 0.775 -0.493 
DIV -0.374 0.029 -0.429 
STRATIO -0.604** -1.435*** -0.648 
GDP -0.218* -0.230 -0.130 
POPBRW2 -20.710 44.920 -117.77 
TREND 0.188 -0.331 0.127 
TRENDSQ -0.008 0.016 0.008 
DEPt-1 0.564*** 0.615*** 0.449*** 
R-squared 0.853 0.873 0.833 
1 Results for GDP were multiplied by 1000 to remove the scaling factor 
2 POPBRW, POPMRW and POPFRW for the ‘both sexes’, male and female groups 
* = 10% level of sig. ** = 5% level of sig. ***=1%level of sig. 2-tailed t tests 
Source: Author’s compilation 
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Table 5.3:  Determinants of Grade 12 enrollment rate 
Explanatory var. Both sexes Male Female  
Dependent Variable: Grade 12 Enrollment 
AB--C 21.492 49.689 32.614 
BC--C 3.130 45.275 26.196 
MB--C 15.778 56.436 31.779 
NB--C 2.069 45.751 26.319 
NLD--C -6.328 58.054 39.052 
NS--C -3.523 44.349 25.160 
ONT--C 21.736 47.950 26.214 
PEI--C 3.431 46.287 26.352 
SK--C 9.155 50.024 29.450 
MINWAGE 6.356*** -3.885*** -2.135 
UNRP 0.946** 0.183 0.143 
AVAGE -0.177 -0.522 0.433 
DIV 1.053 -0.161 -0.417 
STRATIO 0.117 1.443** 0.089 
GDP1 -1.130*** 0.007 -0.024 
POPBRW2 35.373 -120.933 -145.6 
TREND 2.853*** 1.319 0.867 
TRENDSQ -0.072*** -0.045 -0.079 
DEPt-1 0.036 0.279*** 0.553** 
R-squared 0.647 0.794 0.647 
1 Results for GDP were multiplied by 1000 to remove the scaling factor 
2 POPBRW, POPMRW and POPFRW for the ‘both sexes’, male and female groups 
* = 10% level of sig. ** = 5% level of sig. ***=1%level of sig. 2-tailed t tests 
Source: Author’s compilation 
 
The results above show that the minimum wage has a statistically significant 
positive impact on grade twelve enrollment for the ‘both sexes’ category and on grade ten 
enrollment for males. Note that due to the problems encountered in finding enrollment 
data segregated by male and female after the 1991-92 school year, the male and female 
groups have shorter data sets than the ‘both sexes’ group for both the enrollment and 
continuation ratio specifications. The negative impact recorded for males and females in 
grade twelve may be an indication that time dummy variables are needed for the ‘both 
sexes’ regression which recorded a positive response. UNRP was included to determine 
the effect of cyclical changes in the economy on school enrollment rates. From the table 
above, we observe that this parameter was mostly found not to be statistically significant 
with the exception of the grade eleven enrollment regression for females and also in the 
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case of grade twelve male enrollment regression. The sign on this variable is in 
agreement with the positive effect predicted in chapter four. The AVAGE variable was 
included to capture the effect of education spending on high school enrollment rates. The 
coefficient estimates for the AVAGE variable were found to have a negative and 
statistically significant effect on enrollment rates for females in grade ten. No statistically 
significant result was recorded for the coefficient on this variable for the grade twelve 
and eleven regressions in all categories. Divorce rates were statistically insignificant for 
all groups.  
Landon (1997) also included divorce rates as an explanatory variable and found 
divorce to affect the enrollment rates of sixteen-year-old females in a negative way. The 
STRATIO, included as an education spending variable only showed statistically 
significant results with the expected sign for ‘both sexes’ in grade eleven. GDP did not 
seem to have any systematic effect on enrollment rates and is negatively and statistically 
significant for males in grade ten and ‘both sexes’ in grade eleven and twelve. POPBRW 
was statistically significant for male and female groups in grade ten and with an expected 
negative sign. The coefficient on the lagged values of the dependent variable (DEPt-1) is 
statistically significant for all but the grade twelve ‘both sexes’ category. 
5.2.2 Determinants of High School Continuation Ratios 
Results and discussions of estimates obtained from the continuation ratio 
specification are presented in this subsection.  
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Table 5.4: Determinants of Grade 10-11 Continuation Ratios 
Explanatory var. Both sexes Male Female  
Dependent Variable: Grade 10-11 Continuation Ratios 
AB—C 0.353 -0.569 0.044 
BC—C 0.345 -0.607 0.012 
MB—C 0.279 -0.694 -0.056 
NB—C 0.310 -0.668 -0.016 
NLD—C 0.296 -1.105 -0.132 
NS—C 0.271 -0.719 -0.065 
ONT—C 0.309 -0.655 -0.006 
PEI—C 0.352 -0.612 0.050 
QUE—C 0.242 -0.764 -0.091 
SK—C 0.302 -0.639 -0.005 
MINWAGE 0.010* 0.016 0.019* 
UNRP -0.002 -4.8 E-03 -0.001 
AVAGE 0.009 0.028** 0.018** 
DIV -0.001 0.004 0.005 
STRATIO -0.010** -0.025** -0.017** 
GDP -2.02E-03 -1.06E-03 -2.76E-03 
POPBRW1 0.105 5.229** 1.729 
TREND -0.002 -0.003 -0.009 
TRENDSQ 8.26E-06 9.67E-05 0.001 
DEPt-1 0.462*** 0.530*** 0.401*** 
R-squared 0.731 0.818 0.794 
1 Results for GDP were multiplied by 1000 to remove the scaling factor 
2 POPBRW, POPMRW and POPFRW for the ‘both sexes’, male and female groups 
* = 10% level of sig. ** = 5% level of sig. ***=1%level of sig. 2-tailed t tests 
Source: Author’s compilation 
 
 
Table 5.5: Determinants of Grade 11-12 Continuation Ratios 
Explanatory var. Both sexes Male Female  
Dependent Variable: Grade 11-12 Continuation Ratios 
AB—C -0.522 -0.417 -0.098 
BC—C -0.911 -0.622 -0.222 
MB—C -0.567 -0.503 -0.050 
NB—C -0.870 -0.636 -0.176 
NLD—C -0.836 -0.992 -0.170 
NS—C -0.914 -0.657 -0.200 
ONT—C -0.584 -0.665 -0.271 
PEI—C -0.907 -0.738 -0.216 
QUE—C -0.981 -0.685 -0.201 
SK—C -0.706 -0.558 -0.142 
MINWAGE 0.097*** -0.035* -0.044* 
UNRP 0.015*** -0.007** -0.008 
AVAGE? 0.016 0.025* 0.016 
DIV 0.027** 0.015 0.012 
STRATIO 0.027 0.009 0.022 
GDP -0.001** -4.04E-03 -5.62E-04 
POPBRW1 0.665 6.003 2.007 
TREND 0.018 -0.013 -0.022 
TRENDSQ -3.8 E-03 0.001 0.002** 
DEPt-1 0.035 0.289*** 0.304** 
R-squared 0.533 0.784 0.584 
1 Results for GDP were multiplied by 1000 to remove the scaling factor 
2 POPBRW, POPMRW and POPFRW for the ‘both sexes’, male and female groups 
* = 10% level of sig. ** = 5% level of sig. ***=1%level of sig. 2-tailed t tests 
Source: Author’s compilation 
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Table 5.6: Determinants of Grade 12-grad Continuation Ratios 
Explanatory variable Both sexes 
Dependent Variable: Grade 12-grad Continuation Ratios 
AB—C 2.266** 
BC—C 2.384** 
MB—C 2.152** 
NB—C 2.423** 
NLD—C 2.046** 
NS—C 2.327** 
ONT—C 2.254** 
PEI—C 2.319** 
SK—C 2.328** 
MINWAGE -0.055** 
UNRP 0.002 
AVAGE 0.005 
DIV -0.030** 
STRATIO -0.072** 
GDP 2.32E-03 
POPBRW1 0.111 
TREND -2.21E-02* 
TRENDSQ 0.001 
DEPt-1 0.001*** 
R-squared 0.320 
1 Results for GDP were multiplied by 1000 to remove the scaling factor 
2 POPBRW, POPMRW and POPFRW for the ‘both sexes’, male and female groups 
* = 10% level of sig. ** = 5% level of sig. ***=1%level of sig. 2-tailed t tests 
Source: Author’s compilation 
 
 
Table 5.7: Determinants of Overall Continuation Ratios 
Explanatory variable Both sexes 
Dependent Variable: Overall Continuation Ratios 
AB—C -0.593 
BC—C -0.692 
MB—C -0.616 
NB—C -0.664 
NLD—C -1.031 
NS—C -0.601 
ONT—C -0.689 
PEI—C -0.714 
QUE—C -0.843 
SK—C -0.571 
MINWAGE 0.041* 
UNRP 0.028 
AVAGE -0.014 
DIV 0.037 
STRATIO -0.017 
GDP1 6.71E-03 
POPBRW2 1.551 
TREND 0.002 
TRENDSQ -0.001 
DEPt-1 -0.275*** 
R-squared 0.071 
1 Results for GDP were multiplied by 1000 to remove the scaling factor 
2 POPBRW, POPMRW and POPFRW for the ‘both sexes’, male and female groups 
* = 10% level of sig. ** = 5% level of sig. ***=1%level of sig. 2-tailed t tests 
Source: Author’s compilation 
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Results show that the minimum wage has a positive impact on grade 10-11 
continuation ratios for the ‘both sexes’ and female groups, and also on the grade 11-12 
continuation ratio for the ‘both sexes’ category. A positive impact was also observed for 
overall continuation ratios while grade 12 to graduation continuation ratios showed a 
negative correlation with the minimum wage. 
We also observe that UNRP has a negative and statistically significant effect on 
grade 11-12 continuation ratios for males and a positive effect for the ‘both sexes’ 
category. The AVAGE variable was statistically significant and with the expected positive 
sign for grade 10-11 continuation ratios in both the male and female categories. The 
coefficient on this variable was also statistically significant and positive for the male 11-
12 continuation ratio regressions. The Divorce rate variable showed a positive statistical 
significance for ‘both sexes’ in grade 11-12 and a negative statistical significance for 
grade 12 to graduation continuation ratio regressions. The STRATIO variable showed 
statistically significant results with the expected sign for all grades 10-11 groups and also 
for the grade 12 to graduation group. The coefficient on GDP was statistically significant 
for for ‘both sexes in the grade 11-12 category. POPBRW was positive and statistically 
significant for grade 10-11 male continuation ratios. Due to the unavailability of 
graduation data by males and females, 12-grad and overall continuation ratios could not 
be calculated for the male and female demographic groups. 
5.2.3 Determinants of Labour Market Activities 
Results and discussions of estimates obtained from the employment and 
participation specifications are presented in this subsection. Tables 5.8 to 5.11 below 
show the results obtained from these regressions. 
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Table 5.8: Determinants of Labour Market Activities (15-19) 
Dependent 
variable 
Employment rate Participation rate 
Explanatory 
variable 
Both Sexes Male Female Both Sexes Male Female 
Dependent Variable: Age 15-19 Employment and Participation Rates  
AB—C 30.655*** 33.319*** 32.792*** 34.373*** 39.393*** 34.368*** 
BC—C 34.903*** 35.190*** 38.282*** 38.619*** 43.588*** 38.616*** 
MB—C 38.145*** 41.800*** 39.825*** 41.651*** 49.278*** 41.648*** 
NB—C 30.904*** 31.833*** 33.198*** 33.504*** 38.202*** 33.497*** 
NLD—C 24.154*** 25.481*** 25.124*** 25.720*** 29.113*** 25.696*** 
NS—C 30.481*** 31.524*** 32.705*** 33.644*** 38.312*** 33.638*** 
ONT—C 32.482*** 32.678*** 35.960*** 35.839*** 39.929*** 35.835*** 
PEI—C 38.025*** 43.092*** 38.573*** 40.050*** 48.526*** 40.044*** 
QUE—C 31.027*** 34.441*** 31.661*** 33.360*** 39.510*** 33.351*** 
SK—C 36.175*** 43.017*** 35.805*** 38.898*** 48.075*** 38.893*** 
MINWAGE -2.758*** -2.740*** -2.805*** -2.611*** -3.054*** -2.430*** 
UNRP -0.604*** -0.726*** -0.515*** -0.305** -0.276 -0.401** 
GDP 0.655*** 0.766*** 0.597*** 0.637*** 0.823*** 0.392** 
POPBRW1 -0.124 5.491** -5.256* 0.668 6.630** 0.372 
TREND 0.268 0.471** 0.075 -0.131 -0.019 -0.170 
TRENDSQ -0.024** -0.044*** -0.009 -0.004 -0.018** 0.003 
DEPt-1  0.289*** 0.210*** 0.263*** 0.291*** 0.207*** 0.208** 
R-squared 0.922 0.909 0.846 0.921 0.904 0.921 
1 Results for GDP were multiplied by 1000 to remove the scaling factor 
2POPBRW, POPMRW and POPFRW for the ‘both sexes’, male and female groups 
* = 10% level of sig. ** = 5% level of sig. ***=1%level of sig. 2-tailed t tests 
Source: Author’s compilation 
 
Table 5.9: Determinants of Labour Market Activities (15-24) 
Dependent 
variable 
Employment rate Participation rate 
Explanatory 
variable 
Both Sexes Male Female Both Sexes Male Female 
Dependent Variable: Age 15-24 Employment and Participation Rates 
AB—C 35.297*** 49.128*** 30.138*** 40.087*** 54.348*** 37.704*** 
BC—C 38.603*** 51.700*** 34.094*** 43.030*** 57.127*** 41.078*** 
MB—C 41.971*** 57.207*** 36.365*** 45.646*** 60.923*** 42.851*** 
NB—C 35.870*** 48.280*** 31.330*** 39.558*** 52.459*** 37.531*** 
NLD—C 29.588*** 40.641*** 24.999*** 33.651*** 45.572*** 31.393*** 
NS—C 36.894*** 49.341*** 32.457*** 41.092*** 55.479*** 39.108*** 
ONT—C 36.506*** 49.137*** 32.076*** 40.979*** 54.808*** 39.060*** 
PEI—C 41.819*** 56.487*** 36.330*** 45.260*** 59.904*** 42.376*** 
QUE—C 36.717*** 50.362*** 31.172*** 40.337*** 55.046*** 37.184*** 
SK—C 39.259*** 56.009*** 32.140*** 42.914*** 59.527*** 38.479*** 
MINWAGE -1.962*** -2.383*** -1.693*** -1.855*** -2.804*** -1.501*** 
UNRP -0.578*** -0.809*** -0.447*** -0.201** -0.201* -0.231* 
GDP 0.614*** 0.734*** 0.587*** 0.481*** 0.520*** 0.482*** 
POPBRW1 1.861*** 5.134*** 2.509** 1.314*** 3.046** 1.921* 
TREND 0.142 0.125 0.101 -0.243** -0.482** -0.195 
TRENDSQ -0.018** -0.025*** -0.012 -0.001 0.007 -4.1E-04 
DEPt-1 0.318*** 0.107* 0.357*** 0.378*** 0.266*** 0.361*** 
R-squared 0.949 0.943 0.891 0.943 0.888 0.879 
1 Results for GDP were multiplied by 1000 to remove the scaling factor 
2POPBRW, POPMRW and POPFRW for the ‘both sexes’, male and female groups 
* = 10% level of sig. ** = 5% level of sig. ***=1%level of sig. 2-tailed t tests 
Source: Author’s compilation 
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Table 5.10: Determinants of Labour Market Activities (20-24) 
Dependent 
variable 
Employment rate Participation rate 
Explanatory 
variable 
Both Sexes Male Female Both Sexes Male Female 
Dependent Variable: Age 20-24 Employment and Participation Rates 
AB—C 50.299*** 68.802*** 42.416*** 55.825*** 76.312*** 53.154*** 
BC—C 51.784*** 70.098*** 44.354*** 56.762*** 76.791*** 54.838*** 
MB—C 55.117*** 74.401*** 47.356*** 58.740*** 79.275*** 56.840*** 
NB—C 49.327*** 67.265*** 41.800*** 53.820*** 72.352*** 52.315*** 
NLD—C 43.820*** 60.780*** 36.209*** 50.089*** 67.654*** 48.252*** 
NS—C 51.848*** 69.740*** 44.769*** 56.753*** 76.164*** 55.407*** 
ONT—C 50.038*** 67.857*** 42.621*** 55.353*** 75.345*** 52.987*** 
PEI—C 55.073*** 73.189*** 47.962*** 59.608*** 78.735*** 59.370*** 
QUE—C 51.107*** 69.336*** 43.414*** 55.593*** 75.361*** 53.335*** 
SK—C 51.917*** 72.747*** 42.478*** 56.207*** 78.097*** 52.126*** 
MINWAGE -1.246** -1.658*** -0.999*** -1.280*** -1.972*** -0.930* 
UNRP -0.718*** -1.046*** -0.527*** -0.229** -0.237 -0.269** 
GDP 0.424*** 0.458*** 0.481** 0.210* 0.123 0.366** 
POPBRW1 6.727*** 13.992*** 13.975*** 4.318*** 8.415*** 10.794*** 
TREND 0.174 -0.059 0.331* -0.207* -0.490*** 0.082 
TRENDSQ -0.016** -0.010 -0.022** -0.002 0.008 -0.016** 
DEPt-1 0.252*** 0.092 0.263*** 0.338*** 0.213*** 0.246*** 
R-squared 0.895 0.866 0.796 0.847 0.793 0.730 
1 Results for GDP were multiplied by 1000 to remove the scaling factor 
2POPBRW, POPMRW and POPFRW for the ‘both sexes’, male and female groups 
* = 10% level of sig. ** = 5% level of sig. ***=1%level of sig. 2-tailed t tests 
Source: Author’s compilation 
 
Table 5.11: Determinants of Labour Market Activities (25-54) 
Dependent 
variable 
Employment rate Participation rate 
Explanatory 
variable 
Both Sexes Male Female Both Sexes Male Female 
Dependent Variable: Age 25-54 Employment and Participation Rates 
AB—C 56.051*** 77.751*** 31.211*** 38.025*** 51.162*** 29.914*** 
BC—C 56.222*** 78.250*** 31.561*** 38.525*** 51.603*** 30.525*** 
MB—C 57.398*** 78.331*** 33.274*** 39.511*** 51.928*** 32.227*** 
NB—C 51.709*** 75.258*** 27.414*** 37.096*** 50.021*** 29.049*** 
NB—C 51.709*** 75.258*** 27.414*** 35.722*** 48.921*** 27.202*** 
NS—C 54.362*** 76.838*** 30.225*** 37.538*** 50.632*** 29.552*** 
ONT—C 56.321*** 77.883*** 31.855*** 38.395*** 51.406*** 30.607*** 
PEI—C 57.854*** 78.999*** 33.886*** 40.585*** 52.360*** 34.016*** 
QUE—C 54.751*** 77.661*** 29.984*** 37.591*** 51.143*** 29.029*** 
SK—C 57.380*** 78.251*** 33.233*** 39.417*** 51.902*** 32.016*** 
MINWAGE -0.619*** -0.474*** -0.611** -0.494*** -0.423** -0.613*** 
UNRP -0.713*** -1.078*** -0.388*** -0.141*** -0.170*** -0.127** 
GDP1 0.161*** 0.109** 0.203*** 0.179*** 0.107*** 0.251*** 
POPBRW2 0.130** -0.052 0.341** 0.116** -0.025 0.519*** 
TREND 0.477*** -0.130** 0.783*** 0.365*** -0.124** 0.889*** 
TRENDSQ -0.015*** -0.002 -0.021*** -0.014*** -8.40E-05 -0.029*** 
DEPt-1 0.312*** 0.204*** 0.483*** 0.511*** 0.469*** 0.498*** 
R-squared 0.984 0.974 0.980 0.957 0.910 0.967 
1 Results for GDP were multiplied by 1000 to remove the scaling factor 
2POPBRW, POPMRW and POPFRW for the ‘both sexes’, male and female groups 
* = 10% level of sig. ** = 5% level of sig. ***=1%level of sig. 2-tailed t tests 
Source: Author’s compilation 
 
  
 
77
The parameter estimates for most of the variables were statistically significant in 
both the employment and participation specifications. The minimum wage variable was 
found to be negatively correlated with both employment and participation rates for all but 
the female regression in the 20-24 age group. Results for employment supports textbook 
evidence of a competitive market but participation results are contrary to textbook 
predictions. UNRP and GDP followed the expected negative and positive signs while 
POPBRW was positive as expected and also statistically significant for most groups.  
 
5.3 Minimum Wage Effects 
In this section, the regression estimates for the minimum wage effects on the 
labour market variables being studied are presented along with the elasticity estimates.  
Table 5.12: Minimum Wage Effects 
 ($1 Minimum Wage Increase) (1% Minimum Wage Increase) 
Effect on: Both sexes Male Female  Both sexes Male Female  
Dependent Variable: Grade Enrollment Rates 
Grade 10 0.031 1.157* 0.126 0.003 0.038* 0.013 
Grade 11 0.058 0.243 0.346 0.006 0.029 0.039 
Grade 12 6.356*** -3.885*** -2.135 0.649*** -0.466*** -0.244 
Dependent Variable: Grade Continuation Ratios 
Grade 10-11 0.010* 0.016 0.019* 0.054* 0.088 0.102* 
Grade 11-12 0.097*** -0.035* -0.044* 0.463*** -0.182* -0.225* 
Grade 12-grad -0.055** - - -0.395** - - 
Overall 0.041* - - 0.232* - - 
Dependent Variable: Employment Rates by Age Group 
Age 15-19 -2.758*** -2.740*** -2.805*** -0.363*** -0.354*** -0.376*** 
Age 15-24 -1.962*** -2.383*** -1.693*** -0.193*** -0.228*** -0.172*** 
Age 20-24 -1.246** -1.658*** -0.999 -0.099*** -0.126*** -0.083 
Age 25-54 -0.619*** -0.474*** -0.611** -0.043*** -0.029*** -0.048** 
Dependent Variable: Participation Rates by Age Group  
Age 15-19 -2.611*** -3.054*** -2.430*** -0.283*** -0.322*** -0.131*** 
Age 15-24 -1.855*** -2.804*** -1.501*** -0.155*** -0.225*** -0.131*** 
Age 20-24 -1.280*** -1.972*** -0.930* -0.087*** -0.128*** -0.067* 
Age 25-54 -0.494*** -0.423** -0.613*** -0.031*** -0.024** -0.044*** 
* = 10% level of sig. ** = 5% level of sig. ***=1%level of sig. 2-tailed t tests 
Source: Author’s compilation 
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Table 5.12 above presents the minimum wage effects on the enrollment, 
continuation ratio, employment and participation equations. Elasticity estimates are based 
on sample means for the different demographic groups and are intended to show how 
responsive the labour market variables are to a marginal change in the minimum wage. 
The results show an inelastic minimum wage effect. An increase in the minimum wage is 
followed by a lower decrease or increase for each of the dependent variables. Discussions 
in this section do not only include that for the final regression with the lagged dependent 
variable but also for the minimum wage effect on the labour market variables of interest 
for all the specifications discussed in chapter four. Results for these other specifications 
can be found in the tables in Appendix A.  
5.3.1 Effect on Enrollment Rates 
The estimates presented in the tables of results in the appendix and in Table 5.12 
above, show the results derived from the study of the impact of the minimum wage on 
school enrollment of grade ten, eleven and twelve students for the three gender groups 
under study. The first column of Table A.1 in the appendix contains the results obtained 
for the enrollment specification using a level estimate. The results show the minimum 
wage variable to have a statistically significant negative effect on school enrollment rates 
for the three grade-gender groups in the study with the exception of grade twelve in the 
‘both sexes’ group. This result is in conformity with results obtained both in the United 
States (Neumark and Wascher, 1995b) and in Canada (Landon, 1997). These results were 
significant at the ten, five and one percent levels of significance using two-tailed tests. 
There also seems to be some economic significance in the results obtained as on average, 
a dollar increase in the minimum wage would result in a 2 to 9 percent decrease in 
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enrollment rates depending on the group being studied. For males in grade twelve, this 
would mean that a whole dollar increase in the minimum wage would result in enrollment 
decreasing on average by 2,267 students. This estimate was obtained by multiplying the 
level parameter estimate for this group by the average of the grade twelve male 
populations for all the provinces in the twenty years under study.  
In the second column of Tables A.1, A.2 and A.3 in the appendix, we report first 
difference estimates of the enrollment specification. In this specification, the intercept is 
the change in the intercept from one period to the other. The rationale behind using first 
differences is to eliminate the unobserved province effects peculiar to each province in 
the study. Results obtained using this estimate show that the minimum wage variable 
exhibits no significance for any of the grade-sex groups under study. Investigations as to 
why the results from this estimation show a marked difference from the level estimate 
revealed that first differences reduced the variability in the minimum wage variable. Even 
though the minimum wage variable across the provinces over the years under study show 
enough variability to allow for a minimum wage study, differencing reduces this 
variability so much that it renders it unusable for inference, hence the large standard 
errors and low t-statistics.   
In the last two columns of Tables A.1, A.2 and A.3 in the appendix, we report the 
fixed effects estimates of the level specification with and without trend terms. The results 
were similar in every respect. The adjusted R-squared were observed to be significantly 
larger than that obtained in the level and differenced estimates. The adjusted R-squared, 
according to Woolridge (2003) adjusts the fit by including a penalty for the addition of 
variables in a regression model.  
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The intercepts for these regressions are the intercepts for the ten provinces under 
study. Overall, these fixed effects regressions provide a better fit than the previous ones 
and show both positive and negative minimum wage effects on school enrollment. For 
the final regression with the lagged value of the dependent variable, statistical 
significance was observed for males in grade ten and for ‘both sexes’ and males in grade 
twelve. For these groups, a dollar increase in the minimum wage would increase school 
enrollment by 1.16% and 6.36%. These results are both statistically and economically 
significant. It is no surprise though that a negative and statistically significant result was 
observed for the male and female groups as due to limitations, a shorter range of data was 
used to estimate the parameters for those groups. Elasticity estimates show that a 
percentage increase in the minimum wage leads to a .65 percent and .04 percent increase 
in enrollment rates for both sexes in grade twelve and males in grade ten. 
5.3.2 Effect on Continuation Ratios 
In tables A.4, A.5 and A.6 in the appendix and also in table 5.12 above, we see 
the results derived from the study of the impact of the minimum wage on high school 
grade 10-11, 11-12, 12-graduation and overall continuation ratios for the three gender 
groups under study. Level, first difference, and fixed effects estimates (with and without 
trend terms) are presented in the various columns. Note that no results for 12-graduation 
and overall continuation ratios were reported for the male and female groups, as 
graduation data required to calculate those ratios was unavailable for those groups.  
 The level estimates show that the minimum wage has no statistical relationship to 
the grade continuation ratio for the ‘both sexes’ group. For the male and female groups, 
the minimum wage is shown to be negatively correlated with grades 10-11 and 11-12 
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continuation ratios and to be statistically significant with the exception of grade 10-11 for 
females. This is somewhat consistent with results from the level estimates in the 
enrollment equation. The differenced estimates show no statistical significance as the 
variability in the minimum wage variable was reduced greatly by first differencing. 
The fixed effects estimates presented in tables A.4, A.5 and A.6 show that the 
minimum wage variable has a statistically significant positive relationship with grade 10-
11 continuation ratios for all three groups under study. The results from the final 
regression with a lag of the dependent variable show that a dollar increase in the 
minimum wage will result in a 0.01 to 0.19 increase in grade continuation ratios for the 
‘both sexes’ and female groups in grade 10-11, grade 11-12 and overall continuation 
ratios. A statistically significant negative impact was observed for grade 12-graduation 
continuation ratios. Elasticity estimates show that a percentage increase in the minimum 
wage leads to a .05 to .46 percent increase in grade continuation ratios. One can then 
conclude that the minimum wage effect on continuation ratios is mostly positive. This 
result is contrary to results obtained by some United States authors. Chaplin, et al, (2003) 
also used grade continuation ratios as a measure of school effort to estimate the impact of 
the minimum wage and found that minimum wage had a negative impact on grade 9-10 
continuation ratios in states with compulsory schooling age below eighteen.  
5.3.3 Effect on Employment Rates 
The estimates presented in tables A.7, A.8 and A.9 in appendix A, show the 
results derived from the study of the impact of the minimum wage on employment for the 
twelve age-sex groups under study. The first column of results in the tables in the 
appendix presents the level estimates. The results using this estimate, show that the 
  
 
82
minimum wage has a statistically significant negative effect on the employment rate of 
all but two (males 20-24 and 25-54) of the age-sex groups under study.  
The first differenced estimates reported in the second column of tables A.7, A.8 
and A.9 in the appendix show that none of the minimum wage coefficients was 
statistically significant for all the groups under study just like in the enrollment equation. 
These results are in conformity with minimum wage studies where positive or non-
significant minimum wage effects were derived (Baker and Stanger 1999; Neumark and 
Wascher, 1992 and Card 1992, 1994). Second or longer differences could be useful in 
eliminating this problem but this will greatly reduce the number of observations and the 
power of the regression. Baker and Stanger (1999) eliminated this problem by the fourth 
difference but with a greatly reduced number of observations. 
The third and fourth columns of the tables in the appendix show fixed effects 
estimation, with and without trend terms of the impact of the minimum wage on 
employment rates. For the fixed effects estimation, we assume that the unobserved effects 
are correlated with some of the explanatory variables thereby resulting in inefficient 
estimators. Trend terms were included in order to account for time factors. Intercepts 
were reported for this specification for the different cross-sectional units (the 10 
provinces). Results show the fixed effects estimation to result in relatively larger and 
more statistically significant minimum wage coefficients. The adjusted R-squared also 
get significantly larger. In general, the results were in conformity with the level estimates. 
Several past studies (Baker and Stanger 1999 and Landon, 1997) correct for 
heteroskedasticity and serial correlation but this makes no difference in their inference. 
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The results from the final regression with a lag of the dependent variable included 
as an explanatory variable have been reported in table 5.12 above. All groups studied, 
with the exception of females in the 20-24 age group, are observed to have statistically 
significant parameters. Males in the 20-24 and 25-54 age groups now report statistically 
significant coefficients when compared to the level estimates. Note that the minimum 
wage coefficients generally get smaller with the older age groups. The elasticity estimates 
also show that the older age groups are less responsive than the younger groups. The 
results for teenagers is in the upper range of estimates achieved over the years by 
economists who mostly observe an average of a two percent increase in employment 
rates for a 10% increase in the minimum wage.  
Overall, the minimum wage was found to have a statistically significant negative 
impact on employment rates for eleven of the twelve groups studied. The differences 
between the different estimates were not marked. Economically and using the 15-19 
group as reference, the results can be translated to mean that a dollar increase in the 
minimum wage results in an average loss in employment for about 2,810 males. For 
females, the loss in employment is for about 2,768 females. These results were obtained 
by multiplying the parameter estimates by the average of the 15-19 male and female 
populations for all the provinces in the twenty years under study. These results are both 
economically and statistically significant. The elasticity estimates, show that the 
employment rates for women are more responsive to a minimum wage hike than that of 
men. 
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5.3.4 Effect on Participation Rates 
The estimates presented in tables A.10, A.11 and A.12 in appendix A, show the 
results derived from the study of the impact of the minimum wage on participation rates 
for the twelve age-sex groups under study. In the first column of results in the tables in 
the appendix, we show the level estimates from this regression. The results show that the 
minimum wage has a statistically significant negative effect on the participation rate of 
all groups studied. The first differenced estimates reported in the second column show 
that none of the minimum wage coefficients was statistically significant for all the groups 
under study with the exception of males in the 25-54 age group.  
The third and fourth columns show fixed effects estimation, with and without 
trend terms of the impact of the minimum wage on participation rates. Results show the 
fixed effects estimation to result in relatively larger and more statistically significant 
minimum wage coefficients just like it did in the enrollment and employment equations. 
In the fixed effects estimation without trend terms the result for males in the 25-54 age 
groups show no statistically significant results.  
For the final regression with the lag of the dependent variable, the minimum wage 
was found to have a statistically significant negative impact on participation rates for the 
twelve groups studied. The differences between the different estimates were not marked. 
For all the estimates, the minimum wage coefficient decreased with the older age groups. 
Also notice that the coefficients were always larger for the males groups with the 
exception of the 25-54 age group where a larger coefficient was reported for the female 
group. Economically, using the 15-19 group as reference, the results can be translated to 
mean that a dollar increase in the minimum wage results in an average reduction in 
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labour force participation for about 3,178 males. For females, the reduction in 
participation levels is by about 2,398 females. These results were obtained by multiplying 
the parameter estimates by the average of the 15-19 male and female populations for all 
the provinces in the twenty years under study. These results are economically and 
statistically significant and imply that females in this group are less likely than males to 
react to a minimum wage hike by dropping out of the labour force.  
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Chapter 6 
Conclusion 
This thesis studies and analyses the effects of the minimum wage on schooling, 
employment and participation rates. It seeks to provide valuable and up to date 
information on minimum wage effects, which can be helpful for decision-making in both 
the public and private sectors of the economy. In addition, it attempts to reconcile some 
of the previous contradictory results in minimum wage research.  
Findings point to statistically significant and positive minimum wage effects on 
schooling with both the enrollment rate and continuation ratio specifications. However, a 
statistically significant and negative minimum wage effect was found in the case of the 
grade 12 to graduation continuation ratios. For the continuation ratio specification, the 
statistically significant positive effects found were for the ‘both sexes’ and female groups 
transitioning from grade 10-11, for ‘both sexes’ in the grade 11-12 transition and for 
overall continuation ratios. For the enrollment specification, the results indicate an 
approximate 0.04% to 0.65% increase in enrollment rates for a percentage minimum 
wage increase while for the continuation ratio specifications, the results indicate that a 
percentage minimum wage increase results in about a 0.05% to a 0.46% increase in 
continuation ratios. While these conform to results obtained by Card (1992) and Mattila 
(1978) who found zero or positive minimum wage effects on schooling, it contradicts the 
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results obtained by Neumark and Wascher (1995b), Chaplin, et al, (2003) and Landon 
(1997) who found negative minimum wage effects.  
The positive minimum wage effects is indicative of the fact that a dollar increase in 
the minimum wage is not enough incentive to quit high school considering all the 
benefits that could accrue from education. This positive correlation can also be explained 
by the fact that teenagers may choose to remain in school or enroll when an increase in 
minimum wage is introduced as a result of expectations of falling employment levels 
with minimum wage hikes. Another possible explanation for a positive minimum wage 
effect as suggested by Ehrenberg and Marcus (1980) is that an increased minimum wage 
leads to a heightened level of competitiveness in the job market for the few available jobs 
hence keeping teenagers in school. Requirements for greater human capital investment in 
the event of a minimum wage hike for employers requiring workers with greater levels of 
productivity is another reason suggested by Agell and Lommerud (1995) for a positive 
minimum wage effect on enrollment rates. Therefore, the results obtained show that 
minimum wage hikes do not reduce schooling using both specifications.  
The minimum wage was also found to have a highly statistically significant 
negative correlation with both employment and participation rates. The results indicate a 
0.5 to 2.8 percent reduction in employment and participation rates for a dollar increase in 
the minimum wage, which is toward the upper end of the estimates found in the 
literature. These results are in conformity with past and present minimum wage research 
in Canada, United States and internationally where negative minimum wage effects were 
found as in the case of Mincer (1976), Solon (1985), Wellington (1991), Swidinsky 
(1980) and Yuen (1998) just to mention a few. However, the employment and 
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participation regressions contradict results obtained by some early Canadian works 
(Zaidi, 1970; Fantl and Wittingham, 1970; Rhodes, 1973; Dhruvaragan, 1974 and 
Maphangoh, 1976) and research done in the United States by Card and Krueger (1995).  
Differentials exist in the results for ‘both sexes’, males and females in the 
employment and participation rate specifications. For the employment specification, the 
negative effect is greater for females in the 15-19 and 25-54 age groups. For the 
participation specification, the differences between the different estimates were not 
marked but were larger for the male groups with the exception of the 25-54 age group 
where a larger negative coefficient was reported for the female group. This means that 
the female participation rates are less sensitive to the minimum wage than that for their 
male counterparts. One explanation for this difference as suggested by Swidinsky (1980) 
may be that females are less likely than men to consider additional human capital 
investment necessary because of their primary responsibility at home. For both 
specifications, the minimum wage coefficients decreased with the older age groups. 
Reconciling the evidence obtained in this research with that obtained from 
previous research in both the United States and in Canada may require us to argue that 
any apparent differences obtained by the different researchers may be due to the 
differences in techniques, data sets, equation specifications and the reference groups 
being studied. Focusing on the Canadian labour market, more recent studies of the impact 
of the minimum wage on employment and participation rates tend to arrive at similar 
results notwithstanding the technique, data set or reference group used for the studies. 
Given these recent results, we can conclusively argue that the effect of the minimum 
wage on the Canadian labour market is a negative one. The fact that the results obtained 
  
 
89
for the schooling effects are mostly contradictory to some studies in the United States as 
well as to those in Canada that found negative correlations between the minimum wage 
and schooling implies that further research needs to be done in this area to arrive at a 
conclusion on the impact of the minimum wage on schooling. In the Canadian setting, 
even though much research has not been done in this area, the enrollment measure used is 
very important to arrive at a reliable conclusion. A certain amount of confidence is 
associated with the results obtained in this study given the fact that two different 
measures of schooling –enrollment rates and continuation ratios were employed to arrive 
at the same conclusion. 
A major drawback encountered during the course of this research was the 
limitation created by the fact that segregation by male and female enrollment was not 
available beyond the 1991-92 school year. The implication being that the data sets for the 
enrollment and continuation ratio specifications by gender were shorter than the other 
specifications by as much as seventy observations.  
 Even though minimum wage legislation remains popular in politics, in economics 
it is not always the case. Proponents of the minimum wage argue that it helps towards 
better allocation of wealth while opponents debate the inefficiency caused by the 
minimum wage in the labour market. From the results obtained in this research, one 
cannot be forced to take a stand for or against the minimum wage.  The reason being that 
the minimum wage does not adversely affect schooling on one hand and even though it 
affects the labour market variables of employment and labour force participation rates, it 
still improves the wage situation for individuals who remain employed. The afore 
mentioned not withstanding, a step in the right direction would be a carefully targeted 
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minimum wage policy that takes into account the goings on in the economy at any point 
in time in order to achieve optimal allocation efficiency. 
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APPENDIX A 
Regression Results 
 
Table A.1: Regression Results (Both Sexes): Effects on Enrollment Rate (ENRRB) 
Variable Level Difference Fixed Effects Fixed Effects/Tr 
Dependent Variable: Grade 10 Enrollment Rates 
AB—C   60.037*** 81.710*** 
BC—C   56.888*** 81.139*** 
MB—C   57.754*** 83.039*** 
NB—C   55.905*** 79.924*** 
NLD—C   57.702*** 82.128*** 
NS—C   56.113*** 80.868*** 
ONT—C   60.874*** 85.976*** 
PEI—C   53.697*** 78.437*** 
QUE—C   48.778*** 76.493*** 
SK-C   58.533*** 81.002*** 
C 69.717*** 4.3 E-04 Province Province 
MINWAGE -1.888*** -7.5 E-04 -0.785* -0.507 
UNRP -0.066 0.001* 0.125 0.153* 
AVAGE 0.151 0.001 0.607*** -0.524* 
DIV -0.801*** 7.1E-06 -0.383 -0.322 
STRATIO -0.641*** -0.7.07 E-04 -0.880*** -0.033 
GDP 0.213*** 6.41E-04 -0.250** -0.180 
POPBRW -31.780*** -1.023*** -43.109** -51.032** 
TREND    0.886*** 
TRENDSQ    -0.027*** 
R-squared 0.332 0.105 0.736 0.773 
Dependent Variable: Grade 11 Enrollment Rates 
AB--C   51.107*** 64.000*** 
BC--C   48.345*** 63.730*** 
MB--C   44.753*** 61.039*** 
NB--C   44.747*** 59.780*** 
NLD--C   45.901*** 61.562*** 
NS--C   41.779*** 57.893*** 
ONT--C   50.047*** 65.606*** 
PEI--C   46.509*** 61.992*** 
QUE--C   34.354*** 52.563*** 
SK--C   46.798*** 60.258*** 
C 43.026*** 0.002 Province Province 
MINWAGE -2.258*** -0.001 -0.281 0.160 
UNRP 0.149 4.54 E-04 0.107 0.144 
AVAGE 0.506** 0.001*** 0.998*** 0.081 
DIV -1.457*** -0.003 -0.616** -0.835*** 
STRATIO -0.055 -0.003 -1.318*** -0.471 
GDP 0.417*** -3.46E-03** -0.331** -0.181 
POPBRW -33.516*** -0.958** -38.986 -47.559*** 
TREND    1.011*** 
TRENDSQ    -0.040*** 
R-squared 0.358 0.124 0.781 0.807 
Dependent Variable: Grade 12 Enrollment Rates 
AB--C   -72.478* 30.929 
BC--C   -100.413** 12.395 
MB--C   -90.988** 25.163 
NB--C   -99.970** 12.347 
NLD--C   -105.342** 9.740 
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Table A.1: Regression Results (Both Sexes): Effects on Enrollment Rate (ENRRB) 
Variable Level Difference Fixed Effects Fixed Effects/Tr 
NS--C   -107.442*** 6.779 
ONT--C   -85.540** 30.895 
PEI—C   -101.017** 14.303 
SK--C   -87.721** 18.804 
C -6.692 -2.590 Province Province 
MINWAGE 4.587 10.127 6.100*** 6.887*** 
UNRP 2.260*** 5.577*** 0.698** 0.791** 
AVAGE 1.882 10.279* 4.159*** -0.300 
DIV -1.890* 1.114 0.681 1.209 
STRATIO -2.949* -10.579* -2.583*** 0.126 
GDP 0.834 3.404 -0.133*** -0.118*** 
POPBRW -109.718 529.613 44.000 0.741 
TREND    2.634 
TRENDSQ    -0.05979 
R-squared 0.174 0.099 0.652 0.699038 
Source: Author’s compilation 
* = 10% level of sig. ** = 5% level of sig. ***=1%level of sig.  . 2-tailed t tests 
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Table A.2: Regression Results (Males): Effects on Enrollment rate (ENRRM) 
Variable Level Difference  Fixed Effects Fixed Effects/Tr 
Dependent Variable: Grade 10 Enrollment Rates 
AB--C   88.143*** 83.203*** 
BC—C   86.531*** 82.914*** 
MB--C   90.792*** 87.033*** 
NB--C   89.326*** 84.626*** 
NLD--C   111.336*** 98.179*** 
NS--C   88.274*** 84.377*** 
ONT--C   93.403*** 89.858*** 
PEI—C   88.994*** 84.359*** 
QUE--C   81.515*** 79.068*** 
SK--C   89.944*** 84.958*** 
C 97.668*** 0.001 Province Province 
MINWAGE -2.382*** 0.004 0.791 1.192 
UNRP -0.201 0.003** 0.229* 0.283** 
AVAGE -0.189 6.34 E-04 -0.283 -0.628 
DIV -0.531* 1.51E-05 0.165 0.159 
STRATIO -1.184*** -0.004 -0.5871 -0.208 
GDP 5.66E-02 2.02E-03 -0.299* -0.239 
POPMRW -79.437*** -1.771 -306.969*** -223.900* 
TREND    0.615 
TRENDSQ    -0.020 
R-squared 0.443 0.117 0.759 0.762 
Dependent Variable: Grade 11 Enrollment Rates 
AB--C   49.228*** 31.290 
BC—C   47.219** 30.084 
MB--C   46.880** 28.859 
NB--C   45.224** 26.125 
NLD--C   44.093* 9.716 
NS--C   40.652** 22.359 
ONT--C   50.779*** 33.379 
PEI--C   50.579*** 31.276 
QUE--C   34.198* 17.360 
SK--C   48.792*** 29.840 
C 88.358*** 0.003 Province Province 
MINWAGE -5.425*** -0.008 -0.540 0.142 
UNRP -0.074 4.3 E-04 0.434*** 0.490*** 
AVAGE 0.144 0.001** 0.949** 0.856* 
DIV -1.898*** -0.005 -0.187 -0.151 
STRATIO -0.643* -0.005 -1.868*** -1.641*** 
GDP 0.495*** -1.69E-03 -0.172 -0.156 
POPMRW -98.783*** -1.783 -46.068 113.414 
TREND    1.002* 
TRENDSQ    -0.053 
R-squared 0.407 0.146 0.819 0.823 
Dependent Variable: Grade 12 Enrollment Rates 
AB--C   79.255*** 74.448** 
BC--C   69.134** 65.901* 
MB--C   83.995*** 80.710** 
NB--C   74.996*** 70.658* 
NLD--C   128.303** 114.900** 
NS--C   69.427** 65.995* 
ONT--C   73.376** 70.313** 
PEI--C   75.557*** 71.355* 
SK--C   79.891*** 75.166** 
C 107.405*** 0.006 Province Province 
MINWAGE -5.421*** 0.942 -4.586*** -4.085*** 
UNRP 0.232 0.120 -0.135 -0.070 
AVAGE 0.242 -0.004 0.325 -0.106 
DIV -1.742*** 0.524 0.184 0.197 
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Table A.2: Regression Results (Males): Effects on Enrollment rate (ENRRM) 
Variable Level Difference  Fixed Effects Fixed Effects/Tr 
STRATIO -2.333*** -0.323 1.030 1.489* 
GDP 0.713*** -3.74E-02 -0.022 -0.015 
POPMRW -145.004*** -731.849** -545.443*** -456.919** 
TREND    0.690 
TRENDSQ    -0.021 
R-squared 0.437 0.084 0.814 0.818 
Source: Author’s compilation 
* = 10% level of sig. ** = 5% level of sig. ***=1%level of sig.  . 2-tailed t tests 
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Table A.3: Regression Results (Females): Effects on Enrollment Rate (ENRRF) 
Variable Level  Difference Fixed Effects Fixed Effects/Tr 
Dependent Variable: Grade 10 Enrollment Rates 
AB--C   110.603*** 121.536*** 
BC--C   109.387*** 122.741*** 
MB--C   112.558*** 126.699*** 
NB--C   111.686*** 124.719*** 
NLD--C   131.172*** 142.734*** 
NS--C   111.038*** 125.233*** 
ONT--C   115.028*** 128.965*** 
PEI--C   110.919*** 124.378*** 
QUE--C   106.767*** 122.880*** 
SK--C   110.734*** 122.684*** 
C 104.457*** -2.39E-05 Province Province 
MINWAGE -2.796*** -0.007 -0.418 -0.093 
UNRP -0.136 0.001 0.090 0.151 
AVAGE -0.332 4.32 E-04 -0.690** -1.526*** 
DIV -0.534** -0.002 -0.162 -0.239 
STRATIO -1.151*** -0.001 -0.536* 0.236 
GDP 4.70E-02 2.43E-03 -0.230 -0.105 
POPFRW -65.371*** -1.965 -286.147*** -285.093*** 
TREND    0.437 
TRENDSQ    0.006 
R-squared 0.418 0.102 0.752 0.733 
Dependent Variable: Grade 11 Enrollment Rates 
AB--C   73.307*** 65.094*** 
BC--C   71.834*** 64.788*** 
MB--C   70.266*** 62.940*** 
NB--C   71.340*** 63.068*** 
NLD--C   77.427*** 60.577*** 
NS--C   67.924*** 60.600*** 
ONT--C   74.885*** 67.983*** 
PEI--C   74.770*** 66.499*** 
QUE--C   63.857*** 57.843*** 
SK--C   71.453*** 62.708*** 
C 78.069*** 0.002 -0.314 Province 
MINWAGE -4.354*** 0.005 0.198 0.469 
UNRP 0.003 0.001 0.369* 0.248** 
AVAGE 0.249 0.001*** -0.493 0.022 
DIV -1.584*** -0.006** -1.444 -0.498* 
STRATIO -0.617*** -0.006** -1.66 E-04*** -0.987** 
GDP 0.356*** -7.60E-05 -125.3941 -0.132 
POPFRW -73.918*** -1.738 -0.314* -36.543 
TREND    0.929*** 
TRENDSQ    -0.045* 
R-squared 0.473 0.166 0.781 0.795 
Dependent Variable: Grade 12 Enrollment Rates 
AB--C   106.4138*** 98.504** 
BC--C   100.9577*** 93.095** 
MB--C   116.1331*** 107.908** 
NB--C   109.4779*** 100.995** 
NLD--C   167.4265*** 154.304*** 
NS--C   105.003*** 96.767** 
ONT--C   103.6853*** 95.755** 
PEI--C   111.8824*** 103.292** 
SK--C   110.327*** 101.852** 
C 119.802*** -0.004 Province Province 
MINWAGE -6.265*** 0.007 -5.448*** -5.073*** 
UNRP 0.106 -1.67E-05 -0.363 -0.350 
AVAGE 0.175 0.006 -0.499 -0.479 
DIV -1.854*** 0.008 -0.134 -0.112 
STRATIO -1.936*** -0.008 1.736** 1.802* 
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Table A.3: Regression Results (Females): Effects on Enrollment Rate (ENRRF) 
Variable Level  Difference Fixed Effects Fixed Effects/Tr 
GDP 0.383 1.10E-03 -7.58E-03 -8.87E-03 
POPFRW -167.067*** -0.004 -644.084*** -592.029*** 
TREND    0.429 
TRENDSQ    -0.0278 
R-squared 0.359 0.068 0.684 0.685 
Source: Author’s compilation 
* = 10% level of sig. ** = 5% level of sig. ***=1%level of sig.  . 2-tailed t tests 
 
 
  
 
104
 
Table A.4: Regression Results (Both Sexes): Effects on Continuation Ratios (CONRB) 
Variable Level Difference Fixed Effects Fixed Effects/Tr 
Dependent Variable: Grade 10-11 Continuation Ratios 
AB--C   0.887*** 0.742*** 
BC--C   0.890*** 0.742*** 
MB--C   0.792*** 0.643*** 
NB--C   0.828*** 0.681*** 
NLD--C   0.816*** 0.674*** 
NS--C   0.763*** 0.619*** 
ONT--C   0.845*** 0.687*** 
PEI--C   0.919*** 0.768*** 
QUE--C   0.741*** 0.583** 
SK--C   0.812*** 0.666*** 
C 0.424* 0.005 Province Province 
MINWAGE -0.001 -4.63E-05 0.021*** 0.022*** 
UNRP 0.004* 5.50E-05 -0.001 -0.001 
AVAGE 0.006 0.002*** 0.006* 0.010* 
DIV -0.009* 0.009 0.001 -0.003 
STRATIO 0.015*** -0.001 -0.010** -0.011* 
GDP 3.90E-03*** -7.83E-03*** -3.07E-03 -1.87E-03 
POPBRW -0.022 0.311 0.041 0.029 
TREND    2.27 E-04 
TRENDSQ    -1.31 E-04 
R-squared 0.150 0.106 0.671 0.672 
Dependent Variable: Grade 11-12 Continuation Ratios 
AB--C   -0.641 0.569 
BC--C   -1.106 0.191 
MB--C   -0.836 0.484 
NB--C   -1.068 0.205 
NLD--C   -0.994 0.284 
NS--C   -1.118 0.174 
ONT--C   -0.842 0.498 
PEI—C   -1.129 0.173 
QUE--C   -1.309 0.112 
SK--C   -0.884 0.344 
C 1.083 -0.032 Province Province 
MINWAGE -0.015 0.154 0.093*** 0.093*** 
UNRP 0.034* 0.128*** 0.011* 0.013** 
AVAGE 0.001 0.188 0.045*** -9.4E-04 
DIV -0.032 0.067 0.016 0.020 
STRATIO -0.011 -0.200 -0.008 0.017 
GDP 1.83E-02 5.82E-02 -1.73E-03** -0.177** 
POPBRW -1.596 6.179 0.275 -0.120 
TREND    0.027** 
TRENDSQ    -6.7E-04 
R-squared 0.037 0.102 0.540 0.561 
Dependent Variable: Grade 12-grad. Continuation Ratios 
AB--C   -25.653 60.644 
BC—C   -24.408 67.115 
MB--C   -28.054 64.192 
NB--C   -28.159 61.860 
NLD--C   -53.410 36.102 
NS--C   -26.855 63.902 
ONT--C   -26.816 67.169 
PEI—C   -29.828 62.015 
SK--C   -28.965 58.044 
C -17.412 0.935 Province Province 
MINWAGE 1.024 5.044 0.321 0.350 
UNRP -0.173 -0.611 0.081 0.193 
AVAGE -0.099 0.550 0.345 -2.580* 
DIV 0.050 -1.903 -0.622 -0.254 
STRATIO 0.720 -1.155 -0.460 0.776 
GDP -8.60E-03 -0.95 0.016 8.30E-03 
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Table A.4: Regression Results (Both Sexes): Effects on Continuation Ratios (CONRB) 
Variable Level Difference Fixed Effects Fixed Effects/Tr 
POPBRW 47.791** 49.507 175.387** 151.870** 
TREND    1.344 
TRENDSQ    -0.018 
R-squared 0.126 0.038 0.167 0.208 
Dependent Variable: Overall Continuation Ratios 
AB--C   -0.013 -0.688 
BC--C   -0.091 -0.785 
MB--C   -0.042 -0.740 
NB--C   -0.090 -0.778 
NLD--C   -0.535 -1.203 
NS--C   -0.056 -0.735 
ONT--C   -0.059 -0.792 
PEI--C   -0.121 -0.826 
QUE--C   -0.204 -0.950 
SK--C   -4.1E-04 -0.679 
C 1.274* 0.004 Province Province 
MINWAGE 0.006 0.013 0.020 0.027 
UNRP 0.016*** 0.055** 0.026 0.027*** 
DIV -0.014 0.016 -3.4E-04 -0.014 
AVAGE -0.008 0.004 0.019 0.038 
STRATIO -0.003 -0.047 -0.019 -0.024 
GDP 3.10E-03 2.47E-02 1.08E-04 5.64E-04 
POPBRW -0.898* 2.136 1.854 1.848 
TREND    -0.002 
TRENDSQ    -4.3E-04 
R-squared 0.049 0.100 0.096 0.106 
* = 10% level of sig. ** = 5% level of sig. ***=1%level of sig.  . 2-tailed t tests 
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Table A.5: Regression Results (Males): Effects on Continuation Ratios (CONRM) 
Variable Level Difference Fixed Effects Fixed Effects/Tr 
Dependent Variable: Grade 10-11 Continuation Ratios 
AB--C   0.054 0.163 
BC--C   0.015 0.133 
MB--C   -0.106 0.017 
NB--C   -0.088 0.036 
NLD--C   -0.572 -0.398 
NS--C   -0.174 -0.049 
ONT--C   -0.032 0.087 
PEI--C   0.045 0.171 
QUE--C   -0.217 -0.089 
SK--C   -0.042 0.076 
C 0.719* -0.004 Province Province 
MINWAGE -0.043** 0.007 0.030* 0.028 
UNRP 0.002 -0.001 0.004* 0.004 
AVAGE 0.005 0.002*** 0.026*** 0.023** 
DIV -0.023*** 0.002 0.004 0.004 
STRATIO 0.014** -0.004 -0.033*** -0.031*** 
GDP 8.79E-03*** -4.08E-03 -2.06E-03 -1.48E-03 
POPMRW -0.347 -1.399 5.522*** 4.955** 
TREND    -0.002 
TRENDSQ    3.07 E-04 
R-squared 0.192 0.094 0.760 0.755 
Dependent Variable: Grade 11-12 Continuation Ratios 
AB--C   1.551 1.614** 
BC--C   1.253 1.266 
MB--C   1.453 1.469* 
NB--C   1.298 1.351 
NLD--C   1.803 2.150* 
NS--C   1.243 1.267 
ONT--C   1.270 1.277 
PEI--C   1.187 1.235 
QUE--C   1.182 1.148 
SK--C   1.373 1.435* 
C 3.262*** 0.022 Province Province 
MINWAGE -0.105** 0.019 -0.036 -0.049 
UNRP -0.008 0.005 -0.005 -0.007 
AVAGE -0.034*** 0.015 0.002 0.017 
DIV 0.008 0.039 0.012 0.013 
STRATIO -0.024 -0.035 0.013 -7.2E-04 
GDP 3.83E-03 -2.82E-03 -1.16E-03* -1.40E-03** 
POPMRW -0.953 4.455 -4.427 -7.221 
TREND    -0.023 
TRENDSQ    8.77E-04 
R-squared 0.202 0.055 0.731 0.741 
Source: Author’s compilation 
* = 10% level of sig. ** = 5% level of sig. ***=1%level of sig.  . 2-tailed t tests 
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Table A.6: Regression Results (Females): Effects on Continuation Ratios (CONRF) 
Variable Level Difference Fixed Effects Fixed Effects/Tr 
Dependent Variable: Grade 10-11 Continuation Ratios 
AB--C   0.537** 0.592** 
BC--C   0.521** 0.577** 
MB--C   0.423* 0.480* 
NB--C   0.469* 0.532* 
NLD--C   0.321 0.428 
NS--C   0.407 0.467* 
ONT--C   0.499** 0.553* 
PEI--C   0.584** 0.647** 
QUE--C   0.402 0.457 
SK--C   0.471* 0.531* 
C 0.441 0.013 Province Province 
MINWAGE -0.024 0.001 0.031*** 0.028** 
UNRP 0.001 0.001 0.001 -8.93E-05 
AVAGE 0.010** 0.002*** 0.013*** 0.013* 
DIV -0.018*** 0.014*** 0.002 0.002 
STRATIO 0.013*** -0.002 -0.018*** -0.018*** 
GDP 6.37E-03*** -3.19E-03 -1.69E-03 -1.56E-03 
POPFRW -0.156 2.785 1.869 1.395 
TREND    -0.005 
TRENDSQ    3.37 E-04 
R-squared 0.247 0.2357 0.779 0.776 
Dependent Variable: Grade 11-12 Continuation Ratios 
AB--C   1.834** 1.705** 
BC--C   1.636** 1.463 
MB--C   1.875** 1.693 
NB--C   1.711** 1.559* 
NLD--C   2.353** 2.319** 
NS--C   1.671** 1.493 
ONT--C   1.635** 1.448 
PEI--C   1.670** 1.510 
QUE--C   1.674** 1.451 
SK--C   1.747** 1.610* 
C 3.160*** -0.025 Province Province 
MINWAGE -0.094** 0.015 -0.052 -0.065 
UNRP -0.005 0.006 -0.006 -0.009 
AVAGE -0.028** 0.009 -0.009 0.008 
DIV -3.67 E-04 0.033 0.007 0.009 
STRATIO -0.025 -0.033 0.027 0.012 
GDP 3.07E-04 -3.29E-03 -8.00E-04 -1.01E-03 
POPFRW -1.842 -7.400 -6.557* -7.491* 
TREND    -0.019 
TRENDSQ    7.55E-04 
R-squared 0.117 0.058 0.564 0.573 
Source: Author’s compilation 
* = 10% level of sig. ** = 5% level of sig. ***=1%level of sig.  . 2-tailed t tests 
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Table A.7: Results (Both Sexes): Effects on Employment Rates (EMPRB) 
Variable Level Difference Fixed Effects Fixed Effects/ Tr 
Dependent Variable: Age 15-19 Employment Rates 
C 65.112*** -0.455* Province Province 
AB   69.190*** 45.805*** 
BC   68.705*** 50.097*** 
MB   70.501*** 54.183*** 
NB   57.801*** 43.662*** 
NLD   46.882*** 34.106*** 
NS   57.829*** 43.582*** 
ONT   67.522*** 46.869*** 
PEI   66.275*** 53.228*** 
QUE   61.055*** 43.649*** 
SK   68.658*** 51.785*** 
MINWAGE -2.519*** -0.661 -3.412*** -3.022*** 
UNRP -2.112*** -0.439*** -0.934*** -0.857*** 
GDP 0.331*** 1.121*** 5.87E-02 0.763*** 
POPBRW -24.761*** -1.280 0.863 0.576* 
TREND    0.077 
TRENDSQ    -0.021*** 
R-squared 0.704 0.188 0.894 0.914 
Dependent Variable: Age 15-24 Employment Rates 
C 70.994*** -0.333* Province Province 
AB   77.161*** 52.174*** 
BC   75.662*** 55.802*** 
MB   78.023*** 60.635*** 
NB   66.387*** 51.361*** 
NLD   55.592*** 42.245*** 
NS   68.202*** 53.056*** 
ONT   75.029*** 52.964*** 
PEI   73.415*** 59.571*** 
QUE   70.851*** 52.346*** 
SK   74.876*** 56.891*** 
MINWAGE -1.684*** -0.430 -2.635*** -2.205*** 
UNRP -1.889*** -0.446*** -0.871*** -0.791*** 
GDP 0.349*** 0.79*** 5.70E-02 0.815*** 
POPBRW -8.952*** 1.469 2.854 2.060* 
TREND    0.074 
TRENDSQ    -0.023*** 
R-squared 0.722 0.255 0.913 0.943 
Dependent Variable: Age 20-24 Employment Rates 
C 80.585*** -0.187 Province Province 
AB   82.935*** 66.584*** 
BC   81.151*** 67.990*** 
MB   84.185*** 72.573*** 
NB   74.853*** 64.820*** 
NLD   66.634*** 57.806*** 
NS   78.120*** 68.013*** 
ONT   80.493*** 65.885*** 
PEI   81.263*** 71.988*** 
QUE   79.161*** 66.872*** 
SK   80.343*** 68.325*** 
MINWAGE -1.102* 0.112 -1.612*** -1.229*** 
UNRP -1.705*** -0.539*** -0.947*** -0.914*** 
GDP 0.244*** 0.414* 7.13E-02*** 0.549*** 
POPBRW -9.215*** 6.164* 8.124 6.661 
TREND    0.116 
TRENDSQ    -0.019*** 
R-squared 0.694 0.157 0.876 0.893 
Dependent Variable: Age 25-54 Employment Rates 
C 83.792*** 0.330*** Province Province 
AB   68.439*** 79.207*** 
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Table A.7: Results (Both Sexes): Effects on Employment Rates (EMPRB) 
Variable Level Difference Fixed Effects Fixed Effects/ Tr 
BC   71.842*** 78.772*** 
MB   75.676*** 80.747*** 
NB   66.554*** 71.113*** 
NLD   66.554*** 71.113*** 
NS   71.302*** 75.787*** 
ONT   71.637*** 79.472*** 
PEI   76.681*** 80.439*** 
QUE   70.173*** 76.248*** 
SK   75.653*** 80.872*** 
MINWAGE -1.176*** -0.447 -1.630*** -0.808*** 
UNRP -1.357*** -0.660*** -0.607*** -0.850*** 
GDP 0.403*** 0.145* 0.729*** 0.204*** 
POPBRW -1.112*** -0.046 0.476* 0.256 
TREND    0.666*** 
TRENDSQ    -0.021*** 
R-squared 0.821 0.590 0.947 0.980 
Source: Author’s compilation 
* = 10% level of sig. ** = 5% level of sig. ***=1%level of sig.  . 2-tailed t tests 
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Table A.8: Regression Results (Males): Effects on Employment Rates (EMPRM) 
Variable Level  Difference Fixed Effects Fixed Effects/Tr 
Dependent Variable: Age 15-19 Employment Rates 
C 71.649*** -0.787*** Province Province 
AB   80.331*** 46.004*** 
BC   75.686*** 48.237*** 
MB   78.742*** 54.590*** 
NB   63.906*** 42.964*** 
NLD   53.686*** 34.749*** 
NS   63.978*** 42.883*** 
ONT   75.481*** 45.034*** 
PEI   74.807*** 55.455*** 
QUE   70.716*** 44.988*** 
SK   79.956*** 54.980*** 
MINWAGE -2.677*** -1.842 -3.463*** -2.815*** 
UNRP -2.445*** -0.570*** -1.110*** -1.009*** 
GDP 0.205* 1.359*** -0.211 0.807*** 
POPMRW -40.212*** 0.804 5.994 5.576 
TREND    0.170 
TRENDSQ    -0.034*** 
R-squared 0.648 0.191 0.868 0.904 
Dependent Variable: Age 15-24Employment Rates 
C 77.704*** -0.640*** Province Province 
AB   87.636*** 55.316*** 
BC   83.332*** 57.994*** 
MB   86.076*** 64.106*** 
NB   73.335*** 54.381*** 
NLD   63.083*** 46.284*** 
NS   74.680*** 55.561*** 
ONT   82.956*** 54.757*** 
PEI   81.067*** 63.678*** 
QUE   79.685*** 56.212*** 
SK   85.673*** 62.949*** 
MINWAGE -1.703** -1.091 -2.505*** -2.145*** 
UNRP -2.275*** -0.563*** -1.144*** -1.003*** 
GDP 0.240*** 1.068*** -0.177* 0.847*** 
POPMRW -13.272*** 2.592 7.564** 5.006* 
TREND    -0.051 
TRENDSQ    -0.023*** 
R-squared 0.711 0.259 0.899 0.943 
Dependent Variable: Age 20-24 Employment Rates 
C 88.277*** -0.465 Province Province 
AB   92.793*** 72.926*** 
BC   89.728*** 74.576*** 
MB   92.106*** 79.248*** 
NB   83.125*** 72.084*** 
NLD   75.313*** 65.687*** 
NS   85.573*** 74.421*** 
ONT   88.564*** 71.633*** 
PEI   88.459*** 78.423*** 
QUE   87.454*** 73.636*** 
SK   90.834*** 77.521*** 
MINWAGE -1.008 -0.104 -1.304** -1.310** 
UNRP -2.142*** -0.665*** -1.335*** -1.204*** 
GDP 0.132 0.695** -0.125 0.561*** 
POPMRW -9.778 8.575 19.461*** 13.226** 
TREND    -0.212 
TRENDSQ    -0.006 
R-squared 0.722 0.147 0.853 0.878 
Dependent Variable: Age 25-54 Employment Rates 
C 97.538*** -0.221*** Province Province 
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Table A.8: Regression Results (Males): Effects on Employment Rates (EMPRM) 
Variable Level  Difference Fixed Effects Fixed Effects/Tr 
AB   110.321*** 96.686*** 
BC   107.182*** 96.872*** 
MB   106.029*** 97.347*** 
NB   99.769*** 92.521*** 
NLD   99.769*** 92.521*** 
NS   102.689*** 95.033*** 
ONT   108.193*** 96.746*** 
PEI   104.430*** 97.521*** 
QUE   105.515*** 95.941*** 
SK   106.389*** 97.433*** 
MINWAGE 0.017 -0.234 -0.317*** -0.463*** 
UNRP -1.604*** -0.996*** -1.342 -1.214*** 
GDP 3.88E-02 0.182*** -0.350*** 0.127*** 
POPMRW -2.699*** -0.061 -0.478 0.013 
TREND    -0.184*** 
TRENDSQ    -0.003*** 
R-squared 0.906 0.766 0.951 0.972 
Source: Author’s compilation 
* = 10% level of sig. ** = 5% level of sig. ***=1%level of sig.  . 2-tailed t tests 
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Table A.9: Regression Results (Females): Effects on Employment Rates (EMPRF) 
Variable Level Difference Fixed Effects Fixed Effects/Tr 
Dependent Variable: Age 15-19 Employment Rates 
C 58.495*** -0.099 Province Province 
AB   57.705*** 46.029*** 
BC   61.617*** 52.486*** 
MB   62.036*** 54.125*** 
NB   51.603*** 44.764*** 
NLD   39.914*** 33.758*** 
NS   51.505*** 44.608*** 
ONT   59.376*** 49.219*** 
PEI   57.661*** 51.385*** 
QUE   51.107*** 42.627*** 
SK   56.962*** 48.782*** 
MINWAGE -2.366*** 0.477 -3.368*** -3.261*** 
UNRP -1.766*** -0.324 -0.756*** -0.701*** 
GDP 0.459*** 0.828** 0.337** 0.708*** 
POPFRW -59.700*** -5.839 -2.553 -3.403 
TREND    -0.028 
TRENDSQ    -0.008 
R-squared 0.667 0.066 0.841 0.847 
Dependent Variable: Age 15-24 Employment Rates 
C 64.026*** -0.0163 Province Province 
AB   66.942*** 49.701*** 
BC   68.260*** 54.229*** 
MB   70.140*** 57.657*** 
NB   59.638*** 48.820*** 
NLD   48.368*** 38.713*** 
NS   61.929*** 51.038*** 
ONT   67.350*** 51.808*** 
PEI   65.783*** 55.746*** 
QUE   62.213*** 49.011*** 
SK   64.054*** 51.143*** 
MINWAGE -1.642*** 0.167 -2.747*** -2.270*** 
UNRP -1.497*** -0.363*** -0.609*** -0.589*** 
GDP 0.458*** 0.490 0.279*** 0.761*** 
POPFRW -22.744*** 3.182 3.642 3.096 
TREND    0.188 
TRENDSQ    -0.022*** 
R-squared 0.667 0.087 0.868 0.883 
Dependent Variable: Age 20-24 Employment Rates 
C 72.451*** 0.114 Province Province 
AB   72.951*** 60.723*** 
BC   72.691*** 62.066*** 
MB   76.226*** 66.381*** 
NB   66.668*** 58.090*** 
NLD   58.108*** 50.454*** 
NS   70.895*** 62.281*** 
ONT   72.461*** 60.779*** 
PEI   73.759*** 65.667*** 
QUE   70.980*** 60.750*** 
SK   69.786*** 59.602*** 
MINWAGE -1.181* -0.011 -1.975*** -1.253* 
UNRP -1.259*** -0.488*** -0.566*** -0.625*** 
GDP 0.363*** 7.52E-02 0.277** 0.536*** 
POPFRW -27.151*** 16.717* 12.940 13.536* 
TREND    0.415** 
TRENDSQ    -0.028*** 
R-squared 0.554 0.064 0.782 0.795 
Dependent Variable: Age 25-54 Employment Rates 
C 70.457*** 0.897*** Province Province 
AB   26.075*** 62.173*** 
BC   36.450*** 61.267*** 
  
 
113
Table A.9: Regression Results (Females): Effects on Employment Rates (EMPRF) 
Variable Level Difference Fixed Effects Fixed Effects/Tr 
MB   45.453*** 64.781*** 
NB   33.233*** 50.090*** 
NLD   33.233*** 50.090*** 
NS   40.419*** 57.503*** 
ONT   35.290*** 63.137*** 
PEI   49.147*** 63.970*** 
QUE   34.902*** 57.230*** 
SK   44.880*** 64.787*** 
MINWAGE -2.362*** -0.652 -3.04*** -1.203*** 
UNRP -1.114*** -0.314*** 0.147 -0.484*** 
GDP 0.747*** 9.72E-02 1.821*** 0.253** 
POPFRW -1.686 -0.158 2.509* 0.968* 
TREND    1.558*** 
TRENDSQ    -0.040*** 
R-squared 0.576 0.137 0.830 0.975 
Source: Author’s compilation 
* = 10% level of sig. ** = 5% level of sig. ***=1%level of sig.  . 2-tailed t tests 
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Table A.10: Regression Results (Both Sexes): Effects on Participation Rates (PARTRB) 
Variable Level Difference Fixed Effects Fixed Effects/Tr 
Dependent Variable: Age 15-19 Participation Rates 
AB--C   75.078*** 55.414*** 
BC--C   74.502*** 59.946*** 
MB--C   75.859*** 63.748*** 
NB--C   61.529*** 51.142*** 
NLD--C   49.096*** 39.855*** 
NS--C   62.274*** 51.762*** 
ONT--C   72.390*** 56.078*** 
PEI--C   69.523*** 60.176*** 
QUE--C   64.301*** 51.101*** 
SK--C   72.350*** 59.834*** 
C 68.846*** -0.418 Province Province 
MINWAGE -2.032*** -1.189 -2.749*** -3.021*** 
UNRP -1.917*** -0.213 -0.651*** -0.471*** 
GDP 0.363*** 0.909*** -2.31E-02 0.704*** 
POPBRW -25.271*** -0.075 3.804 1.775*** 
TREND    -0.389 
TRENDSQ    0.001995 
R-squared 0.660 0.102 0.885 0.907 
Dependent Variable: Age 15-24 Participation Rates 
AB--C   91.421*** 66.049*** 
BC--C   88.907*** 69.593*** 
MB--C   89.754*** 73.359*** 
NB--C   77.253*** 63.169*** 
NLD--C   66.169*** 53.778*** 
NS--C   79.968*** 65.738*** 
ONT--C   88.227*** 66.647*** 
PEI--C   84.509*** 71.716*** 
QUE--C   82.236*** 64.574*** 
SK--C   86.071*** 69.116*** 
C 79.188*** -0.303* Province Province 
MINWAGE -1.683*** -1.091 -2.504*** -2.539*** 
UNRP -1.448*** -0.123 -0.454*** -0.283*** 
GDP 0.257*** 0.498*** -0.229*** 0.646*** 
POPBRW -8.880*** 0.859 3.561*** 2.0258* 
TREND    -0.281*** 
TRENDSQ    -0.007 
R-squared 0.590 0.087 0.876 0.929 
Dependent Variable: Age 20-24 Participation Rates 
AB--C   107.263*** 84.093*** 
BC--C   103.565*** 85.057*** 
MB--C   104.066*** 87.863*** 
NB--C   94.358*** 80.465*** 
NLD--C   86.752*** 74.864*** 
NS--C   98.819*** 84.597*** 
ONT--C   103.897*** 83.341*** 
PEI--C   101.798*** 88.772*** 
QUE--C   100.229*** 83.128*** 
SK--C   100.730*** 84.088*** 
C 93.847*** -0.186 Province Province 
MINWAGE -1.586*** -0.684 -2.240*** -1.742*** 
UNRP -1.040*** -0.098 -0.379*** -0.324*** 
GDP 2.41E-03 6.64E-02 -0.450*** 0.295*** 
POPBRW -7.551* 3.014 8.631*** 5.412** 
TREND    -0.195 
TRENDSQ    -0.008 
R-squared 0.379 0.017 0.765 0.818 
Dependent Variable: Age 25-54 Participation Rates 
AB--C   69.946*** 79.362*** 
BC--C   73.928*** 79.453*** 
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Table A.10: Regression Results (Both Sexes): Effects on Participation Rates (PARTRB) 
Variable Level Difference Fixed Effects Fixed Effects/Tr 
MB--C   77.620*** 81.308*** 
NB--C   72.469*** 75.616*** 
NLD--C   68.807*** 72.185*** 
NS--C   73.450*** 76.682*** 
ONT--C   73.512*** 79.854*** 
PEI--C   79.892*** 82.424*** 
QUE--C   72.436*** 77.067*** 
SK--C   77.472*** 81.269*** 
C 86.067*** 0.320*** Province Province 
MINWAGE -1.411*** -0.611* -1.944*** -0.926*** 
UNRP -0.627*** -0.102** 0.063 -0.198*** 
GDP 0.396*** 0.113 0.782*** 0.260*** 
POPBRW -0.719 -0.028 0.394 0.241 
TREND    0.800*** 
TRENDSQ    -0.028*** 
R-squared 0.551 0.062 0.855 0.944 
Source: Author’s compilation 
* = 10% level of sig. ** = 5% level of sig. ***=1%level of sig.  . 2-tailed t tests 
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Table A.11: Regression Results (Male): Effects on Participation Rates 
Variable Level Difference Fixed Effects Fixed Effects/Tr 
Dependent Variable: Age 15-19 Participation Rates 
AB--C   85.470*** 55.679*** 
BC--C   81.571*** 59.096*** 
MB--C   84.012*** 65.037*** 
NB--C   67.781*** 51.459*** 
NLD--C   55.852*** 41.256*** 
NS--C   68.374*** 51.877*** 
ONT--C   80.025*** 54.904*** 
PEI--C   78.482*** 63.688*** 
QUE--C   73.953*** 53.394*** 
SK--C   83.375*** 63.764*** 
C 75.864*** -0.7354** Province Province 
MINWAGE -2.2694*** -1.587 -2.979*** -3.159*** 
UNRP -2.151*** -0.226 -0.736*** -0.508*** 
GDP 0.228*** 1.127*** -0.255* 0.794*** 
POPMRW -41.640*** 1.678 12.675 8.139 
TREND    -0.412** 
TRENDSQ    -0.005 
R-squared 0.593 0.098 0.848 0.888 
Dependent Variable: Age 15-24 Participation Rates 
AB--C   100.951*** 72.419*** 
BC--C   96.497*** 75.605*** 
MB--C   97.665*** 80.454*** 
NB--C   83.974*** 69.269*** 
NLD--C   73.443*** 60.605*** 
NS--C   87.722*** 72.830*** 
ONT--C   95.722*** 72.258*** 
PEI--C   92.314*** 79.147*** 
QUE--C   91.038*** 72.267*** 
SK--C   96.582*** 78.784*** 
C 87.220*** -0.457* Province Province 
MINWAGE -1.833** -1.356 -2.566*** -3.067*** 
UNRP -1.702*** -0.121 -0.590*** -0.309*** 
GDP 0.124 0.614*** -0.420*** 0.668*** 
POPMRW -14.670*** 1.003 8.726** 4.065 
TREND    -0.661*** 
TRENDSQ    0.006994 
R-squared 0.538 0.057 0.808 0.881 
Dependent Variable: Age 20-24 Participation Rates 
AB--C   119.618*** 93.065*** 
BC--C   114.521*** 94.005*** 
MB--C   114.821*** 96.949*** 
NB--C   103.842*** 88.908*** 
NLD--C   95.721*** 83.587*** 
NS--C   108.666*** 93.291*** 
ONT--C   115.057*** 91.765*** 
PEI--C   110.584*** 96.853*** 
QUE--C   110.856*** 92.094*** 
SK--C   113.893*** 95.695*** 
C 102.364*** -0.386 Province Province 
MINWAGE -1.704*** -0.858 -2.488*** -2.302*** 
UNRP -1.244*** -0.115 -0.401*** -0.302*** 
GDP -0.122 4.20E-02 -0.695*** 0.171 
POPMRW -11.130 1.606 19.980*** 10.390* 
TREND    -0.596** 
TRENDSQ    0.008 
R-squared 0.363 0.008 0.705 0.778 
Dependent Variable: Age 25-54 Participation Rates 
AB--C   110.260*** 96.540*** 
BC--C   107.170*** 96.792*** 
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Table A.11: Regression Results (Male): Effects on Participation Rates 
Variable Level Difference Fixed Effects Fixed Effects/Tr 
MB--C   106.157*** 97.382*** 
NB--C   101.146*** 93.526*** 
NLD--C   98.586*** 91.381*** 
NS--C   102.451*** 94.759*** 
ONT--C   108.217*** 96.666*** 
PEI--C   104.514*** 97.581*** 
QUE--C   105.355*** 95.729*** 
SK--C   106.562*** 97.500*** 
C 96.040*** -0.227*** Province Province 
MINWAGE 0.052 -0.321 -0.438 -0.553*** 
UNRP -0.665*** -0.107** -0.383*** -0.268*** 
GDP 7.97E-02** 0.165* -0.332*** 0.146*** 
POPMRW -2.478*** -0.051 -0.444 0.0129 
TREND    -0.191*** 
TRENDSQ    -0.002 
R-squared 0.565 0.067 0.799 0.879 
Source: Author’s compilation 
* = 10% level of sig. ** = 5% level of sig. ***=1%level of sig.  . 2-tailed t tests 
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Table A.12: Regression Results (Female): Effects on Participation Rate  
Variable Level Difference Fixed Effects Fixed Effects/Tr 
Dependent Variable: Age 15-19 Participation Rates 
AB--C   68.608*** 58.765*** 
BC--C   70.533*** 63.458*** 
MB--C   70.079*** 64.330*** 
NB--C   57.603*** 52.697*** 
NLD--C   47.388*** 43.066*** 
NS--C   58.557*** 53.583*** 
ONT--C   68.065*** 60.101*** 
PEI--C   62.432*** 58.072*** 
QUE--C   57.351*** 51.023*** 
SK--C   63.627*** 57.687*** 
C 61.259*** -0.125 Province Province 
MINWAGE -1.844** -0.686 -2.350*** -2.601*** 
UNRP -1.616*** -0.294 -0.658*** -0.547*** 
GDP 0.479*** 0.548 7.00E-02 0.460** 
POPFRW -45.624*** -1.545 5.879 2.990 
TREND    -0.283 
TRENDSQ    0.005 
R-squared 0.619 0.035 0.816 0.821 
Dependent Variable: Age 15-24 Participation Rates 
AB--C   80.241*** 61.711*** 
BC--C   80.271*** 65.777*** 
MB--C   80.830*** 68.281*** 
NB--C   69.918*** 59.099*** 
NLD--C   58.602*** 49.032*** 
NS--C   72.708*** 61.794*** 
ONT--C   79.441*** 63.304*** 
PEI--C   75.807*** 65.891*** 
QUE--C   72.567*** 59.154*** 
SK--C   74.376*** 61.397*** 
C 71.813*** -0.042 Province Province 
MINWAGE -1.634** -0.875 -2.487*** -2.296*** 
UNRP -1.194*** -0.124 -0.349*** -0.266** 
GDP 0.388*** 0.384 2.26E-02 0.614*** 
POPFRW -21.774*** 2.534 4.764 3.122 
TREND    -0.043 
TRENDSQ    -0.012 
R-squared 0.575 0.033 0.839 0.862 
Dependent Variable: Age 20-24 Participation Rates 
AB--C   94.407*** 74.610*** 
BC--C   92.281*** 75.747*** 
MB--C   92.935*** 78.352*** 
NB--C   84.493*** 71.618*** 
NLD--C   77.254*** 65.590*** 
NS--C   88.761*** 75.654*** 
ONT--C   92.363*** 74.513*** 
PEI--C   92.653*** 80.212*** 
QUE--C   89.198*** 73.720*** 
SK--C   87.116*** 71.973*** 
C 85.051*** 0.026 Province Province 
MINWAGE -1.483** -0.782 -2.040*** -1.213* 
UNRP -0.820*** -0.111 -0.332** -0.322** 
GDP 0.134 4.87E-02 -0.188 0.435*** 
POPFRW -19.978*** 11.152 14.430* 11.565* 
TREND    0.224 
TRENDSQ    -0.026*** 
R-squared 0.308 0.016 0.672 0.700 
Dependent Variable: Age 25-54 Participation Rates 
AB--C   29.717 79.362 
BC--C   41.062 79.453 
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Table A.12: Regression Results (Female): Effects on Participation Rate  
Variable Level Difference Fixed Effects Fixed Effects/Tr 
MB--C   49.590*** 81.308*** 
NB--C   44.339*** 75.616*** 
NLD--C   39.361*** 72.185*** 
NS--C   45.317*** 76.682*** 
ONT--C   39.485*** 79.854*** 
PEI--C   55.896*** 82.424*** 
QUE--C   40.034*** 77.067*** 
SK--C   48.709*** 81.269*** 
C 76.778*** 0.881*** Province Province 
MINWAGE -2.891*** -0.947 -3.548*** -1.366*** 
UNRP -0.600*** -0.109 0.509*** -0.141** 
GDP 0.687*** 4.56E-02 1.894*** 0.332*** 
POPFRW -0.216 -0.064 2.206 0.985* 
TREND    1.822*** 
TRENDSQ    -0.055*** 
R-squared 0.377 0.035 0.721 0.944 
Source: Author’s compilation 
* = 10% level of sig. ** = 5% level of sig. ***=1%level of sig.  . 2-tailed t tests 
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APPENDIX B 
Summary of Tests 
Durbin Watson Test for Serial Correlation 
The Durbin Watson test for first order serial correlation (ut = put-1 + et), in the residuals is 
given by the following: 
 
DW = Σ (ut - ut-1)2/  Σ ut2                                     (B.1) 
 
Σ ut2 is the sum of squares of all residuals and DW is the Durbin Watson Statistic, which 
depends on the number of explanatory variables and the number of observations. For a 
particular number of explanatory variables and observations there is an upper limit du and 
a lower limit dl. The decision rule for the null hypotheses Ho: p = 0, where p is the 
correlation coefficient is as follows. 
Reject Ho If DW < dl,  
Do not reject null If DW > du  
Inconclusive test If dl < DW <du  
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Table B.1: Durbin Watson Test Results for the Initial Regressions 
Dependent Variables DW  Obs. Var. Decision 
EMPRB(15-19) 1.452 200 14 1.452<dl so reject null at  
EMPRM(15-19) 1.629 200 14 dl < 1.629< du so test is inconclusive 
EMPRF(15-19) 1. 543 200 14 dl < 1.543< du so test is inconclusive 
EMPRB(15-24) 1.384 200 14 1.384<dl so reject null  
EMPRM(15-24) 1.850 200 14 1.850>du so fail to reject null hypothesis 
EMPRF(15-24) 1.348 200 14 1.348<dl so reject null  
EMPRB(20-24) 1.588 200 14 dl < 1.588< du so test is inconclusive 
EMPRM(20-24) 1.978 200 14 1.978>du so fail to reject null hypothesis 
EMPRF(20-24) 1.524 200 14 1.524<dl so reject null  
EMPRB(25-54) 1.197 200 14 1.197<dl so reject null  
EMPRM(25-54) 1.044 200 14 1.044<dl so reject null  
EMPRF(25-54) 1.122 200 14 1.122<dl so reject null 
PARTRB(15-19) 1.436 200 14 1.436<dl so reject null  
PARTRM(15-19) 1.619 200 14 dl < 1.619< du so test is inconclusive 
PARTRF(15-19) 1.559 200 14 dl < 1.559< du so test is inconclusive 
PARTRB(15-24) 1.290 200 14 1.290<dl so reject null  
PARTRM(15-24) 1.409 200 14 1.409<dl so reject null  
PARTRF(15-24) 1.338 200 14 1.338<dl so reject null  
PARTRB(20-24) 1.370 200 14 1.370<dl so reject null  
PARTRM(20-24) 1.602 200 14 dl < 1.602< du so test is inconclusive 
PARTRF(20-24) 1.520 200 14 1.520<dl so reject null  
PARTRB(25-54) 1.019 200 14 1.019<dl so reject null 
PARTRM(25-54) 1.067 200 14 1.067<dl so reject null 
PARTRF(25-54) 1.030 200 14 1.030<dl so reject null  
ENRRB(10) .780 178 17 .780<dl so reject null 
ENRRM(10) 1.218 108 17 dl < 1.218< du so test is inconclusive 
ENRRF(10) 1.501 108 17 dl < 1.501< du so test is inconclusive 
ENRRB(11) 0.875 178 17 0.875 <dl so reject null  
ENRRM(11) 1.001 108 17 1.001<dl so reject null  
ENRRF(11) 1.125 108 17 1.125< dl so reject null  
ENRRB(12) 2.197 162 17 2.197>du so fail to reject null hypothesis 
ENRRM(12) 0.975 99 17 0.975 <dl so reject null  
ENRRF(12) 1.004 99 17 1.004 <dl so reject null  
CONRB(10-11) 1.108 169 17 1.108 <dl so reject null  
CONRM(10-11) 1.093 99 17 1.093<dl so reject null  
CONRF(10-11) 1.236 99 17 dl <1.236< du so test is inconclusive 
CONRB(11-12) 2.184 169 17 2.184>du so fail to reject null hypothesis 
CONRM(11-12) 1.059 99 17 1.059 <dl so reject null  
CONRF(11-12) 1.126 99 17 1.126 <dl so reject null  
CONRB(12-g) 1.298 152 17 1.298< dl so reject null  
CONBOVER 2.691 169 17 2.691>du so fail to reject null hypothesis 
These are test results from the regression with fixed effects and trend terms and no lag values 
The null hypotheses was tested at the 1% level of significance 
 
 
 
t-Test for Serial Correlation 
The t-test for serial correlation is carried out by regressing the residuals from the 
regression on all the explanatory variables and a lag of the residual to test for first order 
serial correlation or an AR (1) process. This method was suggested by Wooldridge 
(2003) to be used when regressors are not strictly exogenous. The results from this test 
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are also valid if the regressors are strictly exogenous. The decision rule for the null 
hypotheses of no serial correlation Ho: p = 0, tested at the 5%level of significance with 
n-k-1 degrees of freedom is as follows. 
Reject null If tcalculated  > ttable  
Do not reject null If tcalculated < ttable 
 
Table B.2: initial t-test Results 
Dependent Variables Correlation 
Coefficient 
t-statistic Decision 
EMPRB(15-19) 0.201084 2.104688 Fail to reject null 
EMPRM(15-19) 0.201182 2.106097 Fail to reject null 
EMPRF(15-19) 0.201002 2.103530 Fail to reject null 
EMPRB(15-24) 0.315563 3.823878 Reject null 
EMPRM(15-24) 0.315596 3.824736 Reject null 
EMPRF(15-24) 0.315534 3.823055 Reject null 
EMPRB(20-24) 0.236385 3.045632 Reject null 
EMPRM(20-24) 0.236317 3.044380 Reject null 
EMPRF(20-24) 0.236439 3.046977 Reject null 
EMPRB(25-54) 0.452725 6.135834 Reject null 
EMPRM(25-54) 0.452632 6.134301 Reject null 
EMPRF(25-54) 0.452811 6.137241 Reject null 
PARTRB(15-19) 0.179458 1.893382 Fail to reject null 
PARTRM(15-19) 0.179544 1.894784 Fail to reject null 
PARTRF(15-19) 0.179386 1.892094 Fail to reject null 
PARTRB(15-24) 0.332673 4.066614 Reject null 
PARTRM(15-24) 0.332684 4.067877 Reject null 
PARTRF(15-24) 0.332679 4.065550 Reject null 
PARTRB(20-24) 0.228920 2.973911 Reject null 
PARTRM(20-24) 0.228905 2.973133 Reject null 
PARTRF(20-24) 0.228914 2.974538 Reject null 
PARTRB(25-54) 0.483756 6.780757 Reject null 
PARTRM(25-54) 0.483690 6.781285 Reject null 
PARTRF(25-54) 0.483817 6.780177 Reject null 
ENRRB(10) 0.291445 2.064575 Reject null 
ENRRM(10) 0.293422 2.086520 Fail to reject null 
ENRRF(10) 0.289625 2.049196 Fail to reject null 
ENRRB(11) 0.355086 2.220260 Fail to reject null 
ENRRM(11) 0.358774 2.228538 Fail to reject null 
ENRRF(11) 0.351738 2.210966 Fail to reject null 
ENRRB(12) 0.357086 2.210260 Fail to reject null 
ENRRM(12) 0.328774 2.258538 Fail to reject null 
ENRRF(12) 0.311738 2.200966 Fail to reject null 
CONRB(10-11) 0.377281 3.104124 Reject null 
CONRM(10-11) 0.376953 3.085023 Reject null 
CONRF(10-11) 0.377825 3.119550 Reject null 
CONRB(11-12) 0.249115 2.038818 Fail to reject null 
CONRM(11-12) 0.235259 1.916847 Fail to reject null 
CONRF(11-12) 0.257483 2.093241 Fail to reject null 
CONRB(12-g) -0.289795 -2.988094 Reject null 
CONBOVER -0.289795 -2.988094 Reject null 
Tested at the 1% level of significance for two-tailed tests 
 
 
 
 
  
 
123
Table B.3: Final t-test Results for serial correlation 
Dependent Variables Correlation 
Coefficient 
t-statistic Decision 
EMPRB(15-19)1 0.043734 0.419404 Fail to reject null 
EMPRM(15-19) 0.098693 0.880334 Fail to reject null 
PARTRB(15-19) 0.179458 1.893382 Fail to reject null 
PARTRM(15-19) 0.179544 1.894784 Fail to reject null 
PARTRF(15-19) 0.179386 1.892094 Fail to reject null 
PARTRB(20-24) 0.057325 0.485186 Fail to reject null 
ENRRB(10) 0.291445 2.064575 Fail to reject null 
ENRRM(10) -0.141879 -0.887576 Fail to reject null 
ENRRF(10) 0.289625 2.049196 Fail to reject null 
ENRRB(11) 0.355086 2.220260 Fail to reject null 
ENRRM(11) 0.358774 2.228538 Fail to reject null 
ENRRF(11) 0.351738 2.210966 Fail to reject null 
ENRRB(12) 0.475729 1.757349 Fail to reject null 
ENRRM(12) 0.103074 1.299734 Fail to reject null 
ENRRF(12) 0.038594 0.501869 Fail to reject null 
CONRB(11-12) 0.249115 2.038818 Fail to reject null 
CONRM(11-12) 0.235259 1.916847 Fail to reject null 
CONRM(11-12) 0.257483 2.093241 Fail to reject null 
1 Randomly selected from the regression with a lagged value of the dependent variables. 
Tested at the 1%level of significance for two-tailed tests 
 
 
Lagrange Multiplier Test for Heteroskedasticity 
The Lagrange multiplier test suggested by Greene, W. H (1993) was used to test for the 
presence of heteroskedasticity. A formulation of this test is shown below. 
 
LM = T/2 Σ
i
 {si2 /s2 - 1}2                                                            (B.2) 
LM = T/2 [{si2 /s2 - 1}2 +… {sn2 /s2 - 1}2]                         (B.3) 
s2  = Σ
nT
 ei2/ nT                                                                           (B.4) 
si2  = Σ
T
 ei2/ T                                                                    (B.5) 
 
Where s2 is the sum of all squared residuals and si2 is the sum of squared residuals for 
province i and LM is the Lagrange Multiplier statistic. The ei2 is the squared residual for 
province i in each period. T is the number of times-series observations, n is the number of 
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cross-sectional observations and Σ is the summation term. Tested all the regressions for 
the preferred specification at the 5% critical value in a chi-square distribution with n 
degrees of freedom and arrived at the conclusion to reject the null hypotheses for most. In 
other words, heteroskedasticity could be a problem for the inference. The decision rule 
for testing the null hypotheses, HO:  Homoskedastic errors with the LM test is as follows: 
Reject Ho If LM > chi-square critical value,  
Do not reject null If LM < chi-square critical value 
Table B.4: Lagrange Multiplier Test Results 
Dependent Variables L.M. Statistic Decision 
EMPRB(15-19) 31.344 Reject null1 
EMPRM(15-19) 62.632 Reject null 
EMPRF(15-19) 29.147 Reject null 
EMPRB(15-24) 14.546 Fail to reject null 
EMPRM(15-24) 18.811 Reject null 
EMPRF(15-24) 23.912 Reject null 
EMPRB(20-24) 15.172 Fail to reject null 
EMPRM(20-24) 14.444 Fail to reject null 
EMPRF(20-24) 20.519 Reject null 
EMPRB(25-54) 33.906 Reject null 
EMPRM(25-54) 56.02 Reject null 
EMPRF(25-54) 29.802 Reject null 
PARTRB(15-19) 25.371 Reject null 
PARTRM(15-19) 49.162 Reject null 
PARTRF(15-19) 25.366 Reject null 
PARTRB(15-24) 10.741 Fail to reject null 
PARTRM(15-24) 128.72 Reject null 
PARTRF(15-24) 25.156 Reject null 
PARTRB(20-24) 19.304 Reject null 
PARTRM(20-24) 26.116 Reject null 
PARTRF(20-24) 25.762 Reject null 
PARTRB(25-54) 60.855 Reject null 
PARTRM(25-54) 81.413 Reject null 
PARTRF(25-54) 23.899 Reject null 
ENRRB(10) 26.11 Reject null 
ENRRM(10) 21.197 Reject null 
ENRRF(10) 16.509 Fail to reject null 
ENRRB(11) 56.429 Reject null 
ENRRM(10) 29.95 Reject null 
ENRRF(10) 29.566 Reject null 
ENRRB(12) 438.32 Reject null 
ENRRM(12) 130.14 Reject null 
ENRRF(12) 130.14 Reject null 
CONRB(10-11) 118.01 Reject null 
CONRM(10-11) 53.794 Reject null 
CONRF(10-11) 56.042 Reject null 
CONRB(11-12) 52.37 Reject null 
CONRM(11-12) 132.2 Reject null 
CONRF(11-12) 184.27 Reject null 
CONRB(12-g) 169.51 Reject null 
CONBOVER 524.39 Reject null 
1 Heteroskedasticity robust test statistics were reported to account for the rejections 
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F-Tests 
F-tests for exclusion restrictions were used to identify which variables to include in the 
regression model for the employment, enrollment and participation regressions. To test 
the null hypotheses Ho: B5, B6, B7 = 0, the following formula is employed:  
 
F = [(R2ur – R2r)/q] / [(1-R2ur)/ (n-k-1)]                                                                  (B.6) 
 
Where q is the number of restrictions representing the number of additional variables to 
be included in the already existing model, n is the number of observations and k is the 
number of explanatory variables in the regression model. This critical value for this test 
depends on q as the numerator degree of freedom and on n-k-1 as the denominator degree 
of freedom. The decision rule is as follows: 
Reject null if Fcalculated > Fcritical value from table 
Do not reject if Fcalculated < Fcritical value from table 
F-tests were also carried out to check the overall significance of the regressions. To test 
the null hypotheses HO: B0 = B1 = BK, we used the following formula which is also 
reported by the regression package used: 
 
F = [(R2/k)]/ [(1-R2)/ (n-k-1)]                                                                  (B.7) 
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The results of these tests are not reported here, but they show that the independent 
variables help to explain the dependent variables in these regressions. The decision rules 
are same as is given in the F test for testing exclusion restrictions. 
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APPENDIX C 
CANSIM Data 
The tables in this appendix present the details of the CANSIM data by series and table 
numbers. Population estimates are from CNSIM 2 Table 510001. 
Table C.1: Employment Rate Sources (Series Numbers) 
Province B15 - 19 M15 - 19 F15 - 19 B15 - 24 M15 - 24 F15 – 24 
NLD D981077 D981086 D981095 D981076 D981085 D981094 
PEI D981315 D981324 D981333 D981314 D981323 D981332 
NS D981632 D981641 D981650 D981631 D981640 D981649 
NB D982005 D982014 D982023 D982004 D982013 D982022 
QUE D982378 D982387 D982396 D982377 D982386 D982395 
ONT D982751 D982760 D982769 D982750 D982759 D982768 
MB D983124 D983133 D983142 D983123 D983132 D983141 
SK D983497 D983506 D983515 D983496 D983505 D983514 
AB D983870 D983879 D983888 D983869 D983878 D983887 
BC D984299 D984308 D984317 D984298 D984307 D984316 
Province B20 – 24 M20 – 24 F20 - 24 B25 – 54 M25 - 54 F25 – 54 
NLD D981078 D981087 D981096 D981080 D981089 D981098 
PEI D981316 D981325 D981334 D981318 D981327 D981336 
NS D981633 D981642 D981651 D981635 D981644 D981653 
NB D982006 D982015 D982024 D982008 D982017 D982026 
QUE D982379 D982388 D982397 D982381 D982390 D982399 
ONT D982752 D982761 D982770 D982754 D982763 D982772 
MB D983125 D983134 D983143 D983127 D983136 D983145 
SK D983498 D983507 D983516 D983500 D983509 D983518 
AB D983871 D983880 D983889 D983873 D983882 D983891 
BC D984300 D984309 D984318 D984302 D984311 D984320 
 
 
Table C.2: Participation Rate Sources (Series Numbers) 
Province B15 – 19 M15 – 19 F15 - 19 B15 - 24 M15 - 24 F15 – 24 
NLD D981050 D981059 D981068 D981049 D981058 D981067 
PEI D981423 D981432 D981441 D981422 D981431 D981440 
NS D981796 D981805 D981814 D981795 D981804 D981813 
NB D982169 D982178 D982187 D982168 D982177 D982186 
QUE D982542 D982551 D982560 D982541 D982550 D982559 
ONT D982915 D982924 D982933 D982914 D982923 D982932 
MB D983288 D983297 D983306 D983287 D983296 D983305 
SK D983661 D983670 D983679 D983660 D983669 D983678 
AB D984034 D984043 D984052 D984033 D984042 D984051 
BC D984407 D984416 D984425 D984406 D984415 D984424 
Province B20 – 24 M20 – 24 F20 - 24 B25 - 54 M25 - 54 F25 – 54 
NLD D981051 D981060 D981069 D981053 D981062 D981071 
PEI D981424 D981433 D981442 D981426 D981435 D981444 
NS D981797 D981806 D981815 D981799 D981808 D981817 
NB D982170 D982179 D982188 D182172 D182181 D182190 
QUE D982543 D982552 D982561 D982545 D982554 D982563 
ONT D982916 D982925 D982934 D982918 D982927 D982936 
MB D983289 D983298 D983307 D983291 D983300 D983309 
SK D983662 D983671 D983680 D983665 D983673 D983682 
AB D984035 D984044 D984053 D984037 D984046 D984055 
BC D984408 D984417 D984426 D984410 984419D D984428 
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Table C.3: Other Sources (Series Numbers) 
Province GDP CPI UNPR 
NLD D24022 D28627 D981008 
PEI D24034 D28648 D981381 
NS D24046 D28669 D981754 
NB D24058 D28690 D982127 
QUE D24070 D28711 D982500 
ONT D24082 D28732 D982873 
MB D24094 D28753 D983246 
SK D24106 D28774 D983646 
AB D24118 D28795 D984019 
BC D24130 D28816 D984365 
 
 
 
 
